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Tout le monde ne peut pas être orphelin.1
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 The first principle of copyright law is that permission to exploit a work can only 
be granted by its authors or rightsholders. While it is usually agreed that it is their 
right to not answer requests for such permission, there seems to be a general consensus 
that specific provisions are needed for situations when permission cannot even be 
requested because a rightsholder cannot be found, and may remain unaware of his 
ownership or of third party interest in his work. This is the concept of an orphan 
work, generally defined as a work whose rightsholder cannot be identified or located, 
even after a diligent search. The issue of orphan works has recently become significant 
primarily because digitization has changed the technology and economics of works’ 
exploitation and preservation, and even created new forms of use of existing works, 
thus reviving interest in a wide corpus of works.
 Though already addressed by some legal systems, orphan works attracted wider 
attention and became a critical issue; raising new questions as to the economic 
adequacy of existing legal solutions, particularly for large scale uses recently made 
possible, and for mass-digitization. The first question was whether digitization of 
orphan works was permitted without the author’s consent. The European Directive 
on Copyright allows it for preservation purposes for all works.2 Although digitization 
involves reproducing works without requesting the authors’ consent, its use for 
preservation purposes was probably deemed harmless to the rightsholders’ interests, 
and therefore an allowable exception under existing constraints defined by the three-
step test of international treaties.3 This approach avoided the need for any special 
treatment of orphan works.
 The same reasoning should probably apply to digitization of written works for the 
production of indexes and search tools, such as the Google Book Search project.4 
1. Jules Renard, Poil de Carotte act Coup de Théâtre, sc. 5, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/
ebooks/4559 (“Not everyone can be an orphan.”).
2. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 
5.2(c), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (“Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the reproduction 
right provided for in Article 2 . . . in respect of specific acts of reproduction made by publicly accessible 
libraries, educational establishments or museums, or by archives, which are not for direct or indirect 
economic or commercial advantage.”), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF.
3. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. Exceptions and limitations are intended to introduce some 
f lexibility, limited by three requirements that constitute the three-step test, in the very rigid system of 
exclusive rights internationally fixed by several treaties. The test may be used by national legislators to 
deal, for example, with situations of market failure, presumably to the rightsholders’ benefit, and also for 
specific cases in the public interest when an exception or limitation does not unreasonably harm the 
rightsholders’ interests. The nature of these interests is neither specified nor limited in existing 
documents, thus allowing for the evolution of interpretation in a changing context.
4. The initial Google Book Search project aimed only at indexing the world literature in the same way that 
Google had been indexing the World Wide Web. About Google Books, Google, http://books.google.
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Digitization for these purposes does not harm the authors and may in fact improve 
exploitation of the works, provided that it is done in an open and competitive way so as 
to avoid the possibility of any control on the works’ market.5 On the other hand, because 
it does turn a profit, it may be reasonable for the rightsholders to get a share of those 
profits. However, it is a rather unusual interpretation of copyright law because it makes 
economic, practical, or technical sense only in a collective way. This issue was actually 
the object of initial lawsuits filed by authors and publishers against Google.6
 These lawsuits evolved into a class action and the resulting Settlement 
Agreements7 have extended the Google Book Search (GBS) project beyond an 
indexing and search tool into the actual sale of (access to) digital versions of works, 
with the global income being shared between Google and the known (registered) 
rightsholders. While this obviously raises no problem for works in the public domain, 
or for works exploited by known rightsholders deciding on the terms of such 
exploitation, it leaves open the question of whether other works may be included 
without explicit permission from their rightsholders. This concerns orphan works, 
but also other works whose rightsholders do not make their ownership and exploitation 
choices explicitly known by registering with a registry set up for this very purpose.8 
The latter works are not considered orphan because their rightsholders could be 
found by a reasonably diligent search.9 The proposed GBS Settlement Agreement 
com/googlebooks/history.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).  However, rightsholders objected on the 
bases that it entailed making digital copies of the works, and that Google was intending to display 
snippets of those copies of these works, both without permission from the rightsholders. Class Action 
Complaint at 2, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005), 
available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/complaint/authors.pdf.
5. The openness is disputable in the case of Google, which tends to burn bridges after crossing them, via 
contractual or economic devices. For example, the scanning agreements between Google and libraries 
essentially excludes other commercial players. In theory, they could pass the same agreement with the 
same libraries, except for the fact that libraries no longer have any incentive to get scanned copies they 
already have. So, if at all possible, scanning the same books would be considerably more expensive for 
any later competitor. Indexing and search engines are a primary means of visibility on the Internet. See 
infra note 107. Hence the control of indexes has converging anti-competitive effects: it reinforces the 
appeal of the search engines that have exclusive access to them; it can help inf luence the market through 
biased ranking of information, though that should be considered an unfair practice; and, it allows more 
effective advertising through association of indexed content and users queries.
6. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2005); McGraw-Hill 
Cos. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-08881 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 19, 2005). 
7. Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 
2008), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/settlement/settlement.pdf. Unless explicitly specified 
otherwise, this article discusses the initial version of the Settlement Agreement. An Amended 
Settlement Agreement was subsequently presented on November 13, 2009. See Amended Settlement 
Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 05-CV-8136-DC (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009), 
available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/amended_settlement/Amended-Settlement-Agreement.pdf.
8. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 6.1. Under the Settlement Agreement, a registry (“the Registry”) 
must be organized to collectively represent the rightsholders and to ensure the management of the 
structures set up by the agreement, in particular the Books Database, which is intended to manage and 
search the information about books. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, §§ 3.1(b)(ii), 6.1.
9. This classification of works is further analyzed in Part IV.B.
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(the “GBS Settlement” or “Settlement Agreement”) actually authorizes inclusion of 
all works, with a provision allowing rightsholders to explicitly opt out10 if they wish. 
This is critical for the project because the cost of identifying and contacting 
rightsholders far outweighs the cost of digitization and index building, whether or 
not the works are orphaned.11
 Orphan works constitute a significant part of our in-copyright literary heritage. 
Thus, there is a general concern that orphan works should be exploited and made 
available to the public in digital form, such as in e-libraries, rather than left to rot in 
physical libraries until they are promoted to the public domain at a time when most 
people will no longer be interested in, or even aware of, their existence. There is a 
general consensus that the latter should be avoided, but much less consensus as to 
how to handle this issue. This is the subject of much international debate, at various 
levels, and it is not my purpose here to give it a complete review.12 Rather, this article 
attempts to analyze identification and exploitation of orphan works in the context of 
the first version of the Settlement Agreement, by contrasting it with my experience 
with the debate in the French context.13 Existing literature on orphan works raises 
two main issues: First, how is it determined that a work is orphaned? And second, 
how is exploitation of orphan works to be managed? I will explore these issues, 
mainly in relation to the Berne Convention;14 hence also in relation to the World 
10. Throughout this document, “opt out” is not meant with respect to the class action settlement, but with 
respect to the standard management of unregistered works by the Books Right Registry, as described in 
the Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.122. As a brief note regarding opting out of the class action 
settlement itself, this might have been considered as “normal acts that authors and other copyright 
holders must perform routinely to exploit their copyright works,” Gervais, infra note 26, if the plaintiff 
classes had been restricted to rightsholders actually prejudiced by Google’s past actions. Imposing this 
on all rightsholders, even without any claim against Google, as the plaintiff classes have been defined, 
no longer seems to fit this classification and can indeed be considered a formality imposed on foreign 
rightsholders, which is forbidden by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. See Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5, § 2, Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].
11. I discuss works rather than books throughout this article because the Settlement Agreement may also 
bear on inserts. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.72. Even the so-called “Books Database” is 
actually for both books and inserts. Id. § 3.1(b)(4). But I do not mean to consider other kinds of works 
than those concerned by the Settlement Agreement. 
12. There have been several studies and reports on orphan works. See, e.g., Stef van Gompel, Audiovisual 
Archives and the Inability to Clear Rights in Orphan Works, IRIS plus, 2007, http://www.obs.coe.int/
oea_publ/iris/iris_plus/iplus4_2007.pdf; U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Orphan Works: A 
Report of the Register of Copyrights (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan; 
European Commission High Level Expert Group–Copyright Subgroup, Final Report on Digital Preservation, 
Orphan Works, and Out-of-Print Works (June 4, 2008) [hereinafter HLEG Final Report], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/hleg/reports/copyright/
copyright_subgroup_final_report_26508-clean171.pdf.
13. Similar discussions have also taken place at the European level, and have led to conclusions that are 
considerably more open-ended than in the French case. See, e.g., HLEG Final Report, supra note 12; see 
also HLEG Meetings, European Comm’n Info. Soc’y, http://ed.europa.eu/information_society/
activities/digital_libraries/experts.hleg.meetings.index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
14. Berne Convention, supra note 10.
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Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty,15 and the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement,16 both of 
which include the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention.17
 Part II of this article presents the different approaches to the identification, 
management, and exploitation of orphan works that are currently proposed or used. 
I then argue in Part III that the exploitation of orphan works, as proposed in the 
GBS Settlement, can only be permitted under some exceptions or limitations to 
exclusive rights. However, according to international treaties, any exceptions or 
limitations have to satisfy the constraints of a three-step test, so I discuss some of the 
test’s possible implications. In Part IV, I argue that the proposed GBS Settlement 
does not meet these constraints because by always requiring exploitation fees to be 
paid for accessing works, it does not take into account new models of exploitation of 
works, such as open access, that have become “normal” in the digital world. The 
following discussion identifies the various cases covered by the Settlement Agreement 
and extends the conclusions from the case of orphan works to the case of unregistered 
rightsholders whose non-orphan works are included in the GBS Settlement and 
accessible without their explicit consent, even though this cannot be justified by an 
exception or limitation. Unfortunately, taking into account the historical and practical 
intent of the requirement, the GBS Settlement’s opt-out solution conflicts with the 
Berne Convention’s no-formalities requirement for foreign works.18
15. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 105-17, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/trtdocs_wo033.html.
16. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights is Annex 1c of the final act of 
the 1986–1994 Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, signed in Marrakesh on April 15, 
1994. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying 
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations Annex 1c, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
17. Berne Convention, supra note 10. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, first introduced in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland, and revised several times, is the oldest treaty 
attempting to give equal protection to all creators in the member countries. World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Introduction to Intellectual Property: Theory and Practice 385–
86 (1997). More recent treaties were needed to deal with the increasing complexity of the types and 
modes of exploitation of copyrighted works. Specifically, the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty include, without change, the substantive articles of the Berne Convention. The TRIPS 
Agreement, which is concerned exclusively with economic aspects of intellectual property, does not 
include article 6bis of the Berne Convention on moral rights. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 6bis; 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 2(2), 3rt. 9(1); WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 15, art. 1(4).
18. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.132; Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2).
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality; 
such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of the existence of protection in 
the country of origin of the work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this 
Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the 
author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the country 
where protection is claimed.
 Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2). However, the protection against formalities does not apply 
to national works. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3).
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 Further consideration of exploitation fees shows that the parties to the settlement, 
unless they are illegitimately granted the right to enforce payment on orphan and 
unregistered works (a further infringement which could undermine the legitimacy of 
copyright itself), will have a vested interest in limiting access to the searchable GBS 
Database, thus severely curtailing its usefulness. The major reason for changing the 
rules regarding orphan and unregistered works is to revive them as part of our active 
cultural heritage. Any obstacle, such as a fee or access control, that does not benefit 
rightsholders, is thus unwarranted and counter-productive.
 In Part V, I first conclude the analysis by proposing criteria for a registry-based 
solution similar to that of the settlement, which would resolve most issues without 
any undue loss to anyone. I contend that only an international registry is compatible 
with the spirit of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Additionally, I argue that 
unregistered works, or works with outdated registrations, should be freely available 
to the public, at least for non-commercial uses, for as long as the rightsholders do not 
update their registrations. This is similar to the former U.S. copyright system, but for 
technical and economic reasons that did not exist at that time. After a brief survey of 
the links between technological evolutions and the hopefully transitory, complexities 
of the current copyright situation, I conclude the discussion by arguing that, even 
though the Berne Convention is not self-executing and can thus be ignored by the 
court, the principles set forth by the international agreements should contribute to 
the adequacy and fairness of any judicial or legislative solution to the issues raised by 
the Settlement.
ii. idEntifiCatiOn and EXpLOitatiOn Of Orphan WOrKs
 A. Asserting the Orphan Status of a Work
 A work is said to be orphan when its rightsholder cannot be identified or found, 
even after a diligent search, so that it is not possible to obtain a license for exploiting 
protected uses of the work.19 The problem with this definition is that it is negative: 
even though it may have been impossible to contact a rightsholder until now, at 
whatever cost, nothing proves that it will not be possible tomorrow. One way to avoid 
this difficulty would be to require registration by the rightsholders, so that they can 
be easily found. However, for reasons that are further explained below,20 this is 
prevented by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which stipulates that “[t]he 
enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality.”21 
19. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
21. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2). Actually, pursuant to article 5(3), a country can impose 
formalities for enjoying copyrights on a work only if it is the “country of origin” of the work. Berne 
Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(3). For the United States, this excludes works first published in a country 
other than the United States, or simultaneously published in another country when the United States has 
the longer term of protection, for example Canada. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Article 3(4) further specifies 
that “simultaneously” means within thirty days of the first publication. The notion is instantiated to the 
case of the United States in the definition of a “United States work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101, which is specifically 
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Indeed, the existence of orphan works in the United States is often attributed, to a 
large extent, to the 1976 changes to the U.S. Copyright Act, which did away with 
copyright registration in order to comply with the Berne Convention.22
 For this reason, legislation allowing exploitation of orphan works that has been 
studied or enacted requires that the orphan status of the work first be established by 
the failure of a diligent search to determine the whereabouts of the rightsholders.23 
The protection that is then awarded to the exploiter of the work against infringement 
suits, damages, and remedies, should the rightsholder reappear, is contingent upon 
search evaluation criteria that may be evaluated before or after exploitation, depending 
on the actual or proposed laws.24
 Some propose to sidestep this problem and the heavy cost of a diligent search by 
having recourse to some form of compulsory licensing through the collective 
management of copyrights.25 Mandatory Collective Management (MCM) requires 
intended to keep formalities required by 17 U.S.C. § 411 within the limits allowed by the Berne 
Convention. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 3(4).
22. Richard Koman, Free the Orphans: A Look at the Case of Kahle v. Ashcroft, O’Reilly Pol’y (May 6, 2004), 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/policy/2004/05/06/kahleversusashcroft.html.
If you wanted to extend copyright past a relatively short initial term, you filed for an 
extension. This meant that the Copyright Office had to keep a registry of works in 
copyright and the names of the copyright holders.
 Beginning in 1976, Congress . . . did away with the renewal requirement . . . . 
These changes to the copyright laws had an unintended consequence: they created a 
class of so-called orphan works, works that would have gone out of copyright when 
their creators failed to renew a copyright claim under the old law, but which are now 
kept in prolonged copyright. (It’s an irony of the law that term is defined by the lifetime 
of the author, but that no registry of who the authors are or whether they are dead or 
alive is maintained.)
 Id.
23. The wording defining the adequacy of the search varies. The two Orphan Acts considered by Congress 
in 2008, Senate Bill 2913 and House Bill 5889, refer to a “qualifying search” which requires a “diligent 
effort” described in detail because the user of an orphan work may have to prove a posteriori that his 
search was qualified. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act, S. 2913, 110th Cong. §§ 514(b)(1)(A)(i), 
(b)(2); Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. §§ 514(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(2) (2008). Article 77 
of the Canadian Copyright Act requires only “reasonable effort to locate the owner,” because the effort 
is evaluated by a court before permission to use orphan works is granted. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.). Japanese Copyright Law allows granting compulsory licenses in a similar way 
when, “after the due diligence, the copyright owner cannot be found for the reason that he is unknown 
or for other reasons.” Chosakuken-Ho [Copyright Law], Law No. 48 of 1970, art. 67, 74 (Japan).
24. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act, supra note 23; Orphan Works Act of 2008, supra note 23; 
Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.); Japan Copyright Law, supra note 23. Canadian and 
Japanese law require prior authorization from a court, while the Orphan Acts state requirements that 
are evaluated by the court a posteriori in case of infringement suit.
25. The use of Extended Collective Management is discussed by Stef van Gompel in the case of audiovisual 
archives. See van Gompel, supra note 12, at 4–5; see also Anna Vuopala, European Comm’n, DG Info. 
Soc’y and Media Directorate-General, Assessment of the Orphan Works Issue and Costs for Rights Clearance 
(May 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/
reports_orphan/anna_report.pdf (discussing Extended Collective Management, using actual 
examples). 
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all works of the relevant type (such as music or films) to be collectively managed in a 
given country by a Collective Management Organization (CMO), which negotiates 
royalties on behalf of each author or rightsholder.26 Extended Collective Management 
(ECM) is a bit less constraining: it gives the right to a representative CMO to 
negotiate the royalties in the absence of any opposition from the rightsholder. This is 
actually quite close to the scheme proposed by the GBS Settlement Agreement, with 
the Registry in the role of the ECM organization. However, ECM is apparently 
used only in the form of Extended Collective Licensing,27 i.e., for blanket licenses for 
a given type of work, whereas Eric Fraser’s antitrust analysis notes that “ASCAP and 
BMI are the closest litigated examples of situations like that in the Google Books 
settlement” and that “the music organizations have been forbidden since 1941 from 
offering only blanket licenses,” as is intended by the GBS Settlement for subscriptions 
to institutions.28 A survey of extended collective licensing in Nordic countries shows 
that it is used in contexts usually calling for some form of limitation or exception, or 
for the availability of blanket licensing, such as broadcasting, retransmission, 
reprography, education, or libraries.29 Blanket licensing is indeed necessary to build 
an effective index and to offer a book search service.30 However, the digital sale or 
rental of digitized books is a different kind of service that does not require blanket 
licensing.31 It is also noted by Daniel Gervais that ECM is “an interesting model for 
countries where . . . a great part of the material that is the object of licenses comes 
from foreign countries;” but this is not the case for the GBS Settlement, if “great” is 
to be understood in a relative sense.32
 Of course, the problem with such schemes is that they are clearly imposing 
conditions on the enjoyment or exercise of the rights, though these rights are supposed 
26. Daniel Gervais, The Changing Role of Copyright Collectives, in Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights 17 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2006); Dr. Mihály Ficsor, Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital, Networked Environment: Voluntary, 
Presumption-Based, Extended, Mandatory, Possible, Inevitable?, in Collective Management of 
Copyright and Related Rights 42 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2006).
27. Henry Olsson, The Ministry for Justice, Stockholm, The Extended Collective License as Applied in 
the Nordic Countries, Kopinor 25th Anniversary International Symposium (May 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.kopinor.no/en/copyright/extended-collective-license/documents/The+Extended+Collectiv
e+License+as+Applied+in+the+Nordic+Countries.748.cms.
28. Eric M. Fraser, Antitrust and the Google Books Settlement: The Problem of Simultaneity, 2010 Stan. Tech. 
L. Rev. 4, 15 (2010), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/fraser-antitrust-and-google-books.pdf. 
29. Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Collective Management in the Nordic Countries, in Collective Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 26, at 265.
30. In this case, the fair use exemption initially claimed by Google in the lawsuit would have had the effect 
of a free blanket license for book search services. See Answer, Jury Demand, and Affirmative Defenses 
of Defendant Google, Inc. at 3, McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No.05-CV-8881-JES (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 8, 2005).
31. From an antitrust point of view, it might be wise to oppose this vertical integration of the book search 
service and the digital access to the books themselves, whether by sale or access subscription. The 
control of the Books Database could also be separated from the rest.
32. Gervais, supra note 26, at 29.
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to be exclusive. Some legal scholars argue that under an ECM scheme, enjoyment of 
the rights remains exclusive and only their management or exercise is concerned. But, 
as demonstrated unequivocally by Mihály Ficsor,33 because some provisions of the 
Berne Convention34 specify situations when exercising the rights may be limited, this 
implies e contrario that such exercise is not to be limited in all other cases. I show below 
that this loss of control over the exercise of the exclusive rights goes far beyond the 
simple loss of royalty negotiation power, as asserted by several legal scholars,35 so much 
so that it may impinge qualitatively (purpose and form of the exercise of exclusive 
rights) rather than quantitatively (royalty negotiation) on the rightsholder’s use of his 
exclusive rights. Thus it clearly becomes a matter of enjoyment, not just of exercise.
 Other scholars argue that, in the case of ECM, there is no real loss because the 
rightsholder can always opt out. They further argue that this is not a formality 
prohibited by Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention because the opt-out procedure 
can be very simple and one always has to go through some steps to exercise one’s 
rights.36 This is wrong in two respects. First, one may want to exercise one’s rights by 
33. Ficsor, supra note 26, at 41, 42.
34. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 11bis. Article 11bis of the Berne Convention concerns 
“Broadcasting and Related Rights” and specifies in section (2) that “[i]t shall be a matter for legislation 
in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which the rights mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph may be exercised, but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they 
have been prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the 
author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be 
fixed by competent authority.” 
35. See, e.g., Silke von Lewinski, Mandatory Collective Administration of Exclusive Rights–A Case Study on Its 
Compatibility with International and EC Copyright Law, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin (Jan.–Mar. 
2007), http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/34481/11883823381test_trois_etapes_en.pdf/test_
trois_etapes_en.pdf. ( Jan.–Mar. 2004), available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/
files/19552/11515904771svl_e.pdf/svl_e.pdf. 
36. Gervais, supra note 26, at 33−35.
“Enjoyment” is thus the very existence of the right while exercise refers in particular to 
enforcement. It would be patently incongruous to read Article 5(2) as preventing the 
mandatory doing of anything. Should authors just have to walk into a courtroom (itself 
a “formality”) without having to file a statement of claim? Not have to deal with foreign 
publishers and distributors because those are “formalities”? Not have to deal with 
foreign tax authorities to avoid deductions at source in a foreign country? Not have to 
deal with foreign collectives to ensure the protection of their rights in cases where they 
cannot or do not want to join a world-wide system through their national collective (if 
any)? That is clearly not the intent or meaning of Article 5(2). Those are all normal acts 
that authors and other copyright holders must perform routinely to exploit their 
copyright works and not—as was made abundantly clear during the adoption and 
revision of the convention—“formalities” prohibited under Article 5(2).
. . . . ERS is not a prohibited formality under Berne. If it is a restriction at all, ERS is a 
mild one. It guarantees an orderly exploitation of the repertoire that will be licensed but 
offers authors the option of going back to Level 0 [Full Individual Exercise] by sending 
a simple notice, perhaps even as simple as an email.
 Id. This is forgetting that there are now other ways of exercising the rights, and CMOs will not currently 
consider them, nor would they manage (certainly not for free) the opt-out request with all Extended 
Repertoire System (ECM) or ECM systems in the world. See infra note 93. These given examples of 
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actually not doing anything at all. Second, it is in opposition to the very substance of 
article 5(2).37
 The purpose of this article is to avoid constraining the rightsholder to check the 
exercise of his rights in each country. Because Extended Collective Management is 
country-based (until now), it means that the rightsholder has to actually check each 
country, with potential linguistic problems and—even small—variations in 
procedures, to keep control of the exercise of his rights, and even of the enjoyment of 
his rights, if his only intent is to be read rather than to be paid. This is hardly simple, 
even with the help of modern communication mediums. Furthermore, given the 
nature of the problem addressed, the formality prohibition is necessarily intended to 
apply to any type of national formality, however instituted.
 Still, it should be noted that given the worldwide availability of the Internet, the 
institution of an open international world registry, common to the member countries 
of the Berne Convention Union, would probably not be objectionable pursuant to 
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, at least in substance or intent. Such a world 
registry should be accessible in all the major languages of the world, so that any 
copyright holder would be nearly certain to be able to use one of them. This alone 
would not solve other issues, but might contribute to a solution.
 Last, but not least, these CMO-based solutions rest on the hypothesis that, at 
least for each type of work, the rightsholders form a homogeneous population, 
sharing the same interests and economic models and differing only marginally in 
their views of proper rights management, and thus adequately represented by the 
traditional CMO policy of copyright enforcement. While this may have been mostly 
true in the paper-printing past, it is clearly no longer the case in the current digitized 
context, the same context that is giving rise to the Settlement Agreement at hand, 
“normal acts that authors and other copyright holders must perform routinely to exploit their copyright 
works” relate only to for-profit exploitation, which naturally entails the usual commercial management 
constraints, but which is not the only possible form of exploitation. More generally, acts that are 
dependent on the modalities of exploitation, or intended to specify them, as well as acts required by 
incidental events such as an infringement, may not be considered formalities. They can indeed qualify 
as “normal acts that authors and other copyright holders must perform routinely to exploit their copyright 
works.” Id. But acts imposed on all rightsholders to establish their rights, or reset them to the default 
situation fixed by international instruments, are formalities.
37. Gervais, supra note 26, at 31–32 (citing World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne 
Convention Centenary: 1886–1986, 94 (1986)). This proposition is supported by a comment on 
article 2 of the 1886 Convention. Gervais, supra note 26, at 32. The former article 2 is the ancestor of 
the current article 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Id. at 31. The comment, which seeks to impose the 
conditions and formalities required by the country of origin via the Berne Convention Union, states:
This was already a great simplification which will be appreciated if it is recalled that 
there was a time not so long ago when, to guarantee a work protection in a foreign 
country, even by virtue of an international convention, it was necessary to register and 
often even to deposit that work in the foreign country within a certain time limit.
 Id.; see also World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Comm. on Copyright and Related 
Rights, Survey of National Legislation on Voluntary Registration Systems for Copyright and Related Rights, 
Doc. SCCR/13/2, § I(B) (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/
sccr_13/sccr_13_2.pdf. 
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because copyright enforcement is no longer essential to finance the dissemination of 
works, and this opens the door to a greater variety of policies. Hence, the legitimacy 
of CMOs to represent the interests of rightsholders becomes highly disputable, 
especially when they claim that their representation can be extended to rightsholders 
who have not actively chosen to be represented by them.38
 B. Exploiting Orphan Works
 There is a strong lobby in France taking the position that a private organization 
or organizations should be entrusted with some form of guardianship over orphan 
works and manage them in place of the actual rightsholder, including granting 
licenses and collecting fees.39 There is, however, a consensus, shared by the Canadian 
Copyright Act,40 that the licenses thus granted should not be exclusive.41 This 
38. This evolution is best explained in terms of physics. The “natural” socio-economic laws of the copyright 
world may be seen as a physical system. Until recently, the only way to disseminate works, and books in 
particular, was through their materialization in a concrete tangible medium. This has a significant cost 
in production and transport, and thus can be done only in a commercial setting fueled by the revenue 
from copyright exploitation.
 The advent of digitization and the Internet has made this cost negligible, especially for books, thereby 
changing one fundamental law of our physical system, so that dissemination and some forms of exploitation 
do not necessarily require extracting revenue from copyright, and enforcing copyright exclusivity may even 
become counterproductive. This change in the physics of copyright is akin to a phase transition in physics, 
for example when water freezes, so that excellent devices like pumps, conceived for the physics of liquids, 
no longer work as well. Furthermore, we encounter another physical phenomenon, often associated with 
phase transition that is still to be further analyzed in the physics of copyright: symmetry breaking. This 
essentially means that some elements of our physical system, in this case some characteristics of the 
rightsholders, that were formerly essentially not discernible, are now distinct. It refers precisely to the fact 
that in the new physics, the best interest of some rightsholders—not all—requires policies other than the 
enforcement of copyright, which was formerly unavoidable. This translates into new models of creation 
and exploitation like open access to academic literature, open source software, and open collaboration like 
Wikipedia, to name the better known examples. We have reasons to believe that this symmetry breaking 
also takes other forms, with other consequences for rightsholders, but this is still being investigated. Our 
purpose here is not to dispute the usefulness of CMOs. However, like our water pump, a CMO is a device 
built on copyright physics. Given the phase transition undergone by copyright, it must be ascertained that 
CMOs are still working as they used to, and particularly that they remain uniformly representative of the 
same communities. We contend that this is not the case, even without taking orphan works rightsholders 
into account. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. Also, it raises the question of where these 
rightsholders would stand in these distinct sub-communities, or subclasses in class action terminology, in 
addition to the specificity of owning orphan works.
39. See Rapport de la Commission sur les oeuvres orphelines, Jean Martin (Président) et Sophie-Justine 
Lieber (Rapporteur), at 15–17, Conseil Supérieur de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique Report from 
the Commission on Orphan Works, Jean Martin (President) and Sophie-Justine Lieber (Reporter), 
High Council on Artistic and Literary Property March 19, 2008, http://www.cspla.culture.gouv.fr/
CONTENU/rapoeuvor08.pdf [hereinafter CSPLA Report]; see also Livre blanc pour la relance de la 
politique culturelle, at 70–74, Commission pour la Relance de la Politique Culturelle (CRPC) [White 
Paper on Boosting Cultural Policy, Commission on Boosting Cultural Policy], February 22, 2007, 
http://www.crpc.free.fr/C.R.P.C/page8/files/Livre%20Blanc%20CPI.pdf.
40. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.).
41. CSPLA Report, supra note 39, at 19. The CSPLA Report rejected exclusivity, even for a very limited 
time intended to compensate the cost of the diligent search required to assert the orphan status, since 
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consensus can be contrasted with the settlement proposal which, though not formally 
exclusive, would place the parties to the settlement in a globally privileged position 
that may not be attainable again by normal contractual procedure or even through a 
legal defense based on the GBS Settlement precedent, de facto resulting into an 
exclusivity granted to Google by the Registry.42
 According to that French lobby, these guardian organizations should naturally be 
CMOs. But their purpose is only to control the management of orphan works, not to 
simplify their access and use. Hence, they do not propose anything like MCM or 
ECM, which could limit the exclusive rights of rightsholders of non-orphan works, 
and they explicitly require the preservation of the costly constraint of the diligent 
search for rightsholders. To summarize, they propose a form of MCM that is 
mandatory only for orphan works, thus requiring a diligent search. The only public 
benefit would be the possibility of getting a license at cost, while the guardian CMO 
would keep the fees for some time in case the rightsholders reappear, then use them 
for their usual purposes, such as paying other artists, supporting publishers, and 
promoting creation, which are the “official” descriptions of such purposes.
 This extremist, one-sided solution has the advantage of exhibiting where the 
CMOs see their best interest, which does not necessarily represent that of the whole 
community. Apparently, their main concern is that free access to orphan works would 
result in unfair competition to other works; but this economic argument does not 
really hold, especially where digital versions are concerned.43 There is also the idea 
that the public should not take unfair advantage of the fact that the work is 
orphaned.44
 Another untold CMO motivation is that any revenue that can be extracted from 
the public should be extracted, even though it is unlikely to increase the total revenue. 
Generally, it only changes the slicing of a cake with a fixed size. Ironically, trying to 
make a profit on orphan works may even be a lose-lose proposition: because of the 
fee enforcement on orphan works, less works will be accessible to the public; and, 
because some of the profit from orphan works will be used for other purposes, less 
this cost is normally incurred only by the first licensee, arguing that it goes against the purpose of this 
exception to exclusive rights on orphan works. Article 77(2) of the Canadian Copyright Act also 
stipulates that licenses cannot be exclusive. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 (Can.).
42. This is one of the major criticisms of the settlement, emphasized by many authors. See, e.g., James 
Grimmelmann, The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, and the Future of Books, The Am. Const. 
Soc’y for L. & Pol’y 10, Apr. 2009, at 11, http://www.acslaw.org/files/Grimmelmann%20Issue%20
Brief.pdf; see also Randal C. Picker, The Google Book Search Settlement: A New Orphan-Works Monopoly? 
(U. Chi. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 462, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1387582.
43. This economic point is further explored and developed in Bernard Lang, L’exploitation des oeuvres 
orphelines dans les secteurs de l ’ écrit et de l ’ image fixe, (Annex to the CSPLA Report), at 19–25 (Mar. 17, 
2008), http://www.datcha.net/orphan/oeuvres-orphelines-BLang.pdf. Some of the arguments are 
presented infra Part IV.A.
44. Id. at 18. This argument was used in working groups, but I have not seen it in writing. The same people 
making the argument in the French context do not consider it unfair to take the advantage for 
themselves.
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money will be available to pay authors of non-orphan works. Additionally, in the 
case of the GBS Settlement, authors are limited as to the amount of extra revenue 
they can receive from such unclaimed funds.45
 With respect to the GBS Settlement, it is interesting to note that both the 
Authors Guild and the Association of American Publishers publicly stated their 
opinion on this issue. The Authors Guild stated that “[t]his fee amounts to an 
unnecessary tax on users if no owner comes forward.”46 The Association of American 
Publishers wrote in a joint statement: “Since copyright holders will be unlikely to 
come forward to claim the money in true ‘orphan work’ situations, the payments 
function more like a user ‘tax’ that discourages, rather than encourages, efforts to use 
these works.”47 These opinions seem to be in contradiction to the proposed GBS 
Settlement these groups are now supporting.
 Another motivation to propose collective management of orphan works (which 
is, to some extent, what the proposed GBS Settlement would amount to) is to prevent 
abuse of the orphan status to justify copyright infringement. This is apparently 
plaguing the still images community (e.g., illustrators and photographers), which was 
most vocal against the proposed U.S. Orphan Works Acts,48 and a strong supporter 
in France of the proposed scheme for collective management of orphan works.49 
However, the collective management policy proposed in France seems ineffective 
and possibly self-defeating because the orphan status is always non-obvious,50 unless 
its coverage is extended and based on a registry system, as proposed by the Settlement 
Agreement but opposed by the visual artists.51 Hence, it is most likely that the still 
images community would be strongly opposed to the settlement if orphaned graphic 
45. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 6.3.
46. Letter from Paul Aiken, Exec. Dir., The Authors Guild, Inc., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Reg. for Pol’y & 
Int’l Aff., U.S. Copyright Office 7 (May 9, 2005), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
comments/reply/OWR0135-AuthorsGuild.pdf. 
47. Letter from Allen Adler, Vice Pres. for Legal & Gov’t Aff., Ass’n of Am. Pub. et al., to to Jule L. Sigall, 
Ass’n Reg. for Pol’y & Int’l Aff., U.S. Copyright Office 6 (Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/comments/OW0605-AAPP-SIIA.pdf.
48. There have been several proposals for an Orphan Works Act, the last two being very similar. See Shawn 
Bentley Orphan Works Act, supra note 23; Orphan Works Act of 2008, supra note 23.
49. See How the Orphan Works Bills Affects Visual Artists, Legislative Action Center, ASIP Home, http://
capwiz.com/illustratorspartnership/issues/bills/?billid=11320236 (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).
50. See Lang, supra note 43, § 4.5. Collective management of orphan works does not give any new leverage 
against abuse of the orphan status. Either the rightsholder is reachable and then orphan work legislation 
is irrelevant, but no one can act unless explicitly mandated by the rightsholder, as usual; or it actually is 
an orphan work, but no one will be willing to pay for a diligent search to prove it, which will prevent any 
action. And even if someone were willing to pay for the search, collective management of orphan works 
would enable new possibilities for action against (ab)use only when the work is actually orphan (upon 
failure of the diligent search), i.e., precisely when its exploitation is not really harming anyone.
51. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, art. VI; see also How the Orphan Works Bills Affects Visual Artists, 
supra note 49.
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works, particularly photographs, were to be included; but not including them may 
itself be a problem,52 albeit a smaller one in the U.S. context.
 Whatever one may think of these, or any other motivations, and whether they are 
fair, logical, or make any economic sense, is a topic for long discussions.53 There are 
also arguments on both sides. One possible argument against CMO management of 
orphan works is that attributing the benefits derived from the work of an author to 
third parties, and particularly to other authors, may demean the rights of authors by 
eliminating the link between the work and the benefits from the work. This is a 
dangerous path for authors in the long term. It may degrade what is currently 
considered a sui generis human right into a mere right to payment.54 Besides, given 
that the increase of orphan works is a direct consequence of the reduction of the 
public domain due to longer terms of copyrights, the least that could be done would 
be to compensate the public domain when it is at no cost to the rightsholders.
 C. Infringement and Bypassing Exclusive Rights
 Any management of an author’s legal or economic rights without a mandate or 
explicit permission to do so is a priori an infringement of those rights which are 
defined as being exclusive.55 If it is deemed necessary to institute some form of 
trusteeship or guardianship for an orphan work, so as to prevent its freezing (i.e., its 
inability to be exploited) at everyone’s loss, then such action must respect at least two 
basic principles.
1.  Any trusteeship should be instituted primarily on the basis of 
preserving the interest of the party, goods, or estate placed under 
this trusteeship, taking into account the policy motives for its 
institution. So far, the motivations identified for supporting 
collective management do not obey this rule. They are purely 
concerned with the rightsholders of non-orphan works, 
specifically: avoiding competition, making more money, and 
curbing piracy of non-orphan works. There is no real consideration 
for the best interest of orphan works and their rightsholders. Nor 
is there any consideration for the public, which is supposed to be 
the next interested party: a work is primarily a communication 
between an author and his audience.
52. Modifying the books by removing still images may be considered an alteration of the work, which may 
not be acceptable under the moral rights of some countries.
53. See Lang, supra note 43.
54. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), at 70 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”).
55. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 9(1) (“Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this 
Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner 
or form.”).
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2.  No solution to the orphan works problem will be found without 
some change to the current copyright status quo, at least where 
orphan works are concerned. This being acknowledged, it seems 
natural to look for a solution which will require minimal change 
to the existing rules.
The “exceptions and limitations” clauses of existing copyright treaties already address 
the situation. Rather than being extensively enumerated, the allowable exceptions or 
limitations to a rightsholder’s exclusive rights over a work are defined in intention by 
a set of constraints referred to as the “three-step test.”
iii. EXCEptiOns and LiMitatiOns: thE thrEE-stEp tEst
 The three-step test to determine allowable exceptions and limitations was 
introduced during the Stockholm Intellectual Property Conference in 196756 and 
was incorporated in several international agreements, including the Berne 
Convention,57 the WIPO Copyright Treaty,58 and the TRIPS Agreement.59 The 
expression “three-step test” is generally used in reference to these international 
treaties. From the point of view of U.S. common law, exceptions and limitations to 
the rightsholder’s exclusive rights to a work often translate into “fair use,”60 which is 
an open-ended, catch-all clause for situations not supposed to harm the rightsholder 
significantly. There are, however, a number of other specific limitations on exclusive 
rights which are listed in the treaties and in the U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 (the 
“Copyright Act”) to allow exploitation of works by non-rightsholders in specific 
situations.61 The three-step test is a balancing test to be used by courts and legislative 
bodies to determine if proposed exceptions and limitations to the rightsholder’s 
exclusive rights to a work are allowable under these international treaties.62
 The three criteria imposed by the test are that: (1) the exception or limitation is 
restricted to a special case; (2) it does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work; and (3) it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
The three-step test specifies that exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights are 
for special cases: orphan works can certainly be seen as a special case because an 
orphan work characterizes a limited subset of works in a situation that is detrimental 
56. World Intellectual Property Organization, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of 
Stockholm 1144 (1967).
57. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 9(2). 
58. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 15, art. 10(2). 
59. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 13. 
60. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006 & Supp. 2010). Note that fair use is about the free use of works in specific ways 
and circumstances. Exceptions and limitation have the same open-ended logic controlled by a balancing 
test, but not necessarily for free, non-paying uses. Id. 
61. Id. §§ 108–12, 117, 119–21, 122. 
62. See generally Jennifer Suzanne Bresson Bisk, Book Search is Beautiful?: An Analysis of Whether Google Book 
Search Violates International Copyright Law, 17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 271 (2007) (providing further 
discussion on the relationship between fair use and the three-step test). 
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to all interested parties, and that is likely not to be known to, or desired by, the 
concerned rightsholders. However, the idea that an exception should be limited to a 
special case indicates that it should be motivated by that special case, and that the 
motivations should be explicit or obvious—otherwise anything could be construed as 
a special case.63 This also implies that the exception should be minimal, i.e., limited 
to whatever steps are necessary to meet the need that motivates the exception. The 
other two steps of the test also indicate that disruption of the interests of rightsholders 
should be minimal. Those interests should be assessed in the context of the exception, 
taking into account the nature of the exception and the situations or issues that 
justify it.
 These principles do not seem to have guided either the solution proposed in 
France, or the proposed GBS Settlement, where orphan works are concerned. 
Furthermore, in the specific case of missing rightsholders, the responsibility of 
managing the works should not be entrusted to a private party having a clear conflict 
of interest. Such a conf lict is quite transparent in the case of the French lobby, 
claiming the trusteeship of orphan works (directly or indirectly) while endorsing 
policy choices based on their own interests. The effective position of the authors/
publishers class in the settlement seems very similar, if less candid.64
 The GBS Settlement would clearly create a situation that, without explicit 
consent, would infringe on the exclusive rights of the rightsholders of works included 
in the registry, including orphan works. This calls for two remarks. First, the 
proposed Settlement Agreement as a class action would in effect authorize systematic 
infringement of the exclusive rights of two specific subclasses of rightsholders, one 
being the subclass of orphan works rightsholders, which, by its very definition, cannot 
have anyone representing them and their interests in this lawsuit.65 Second, 
international treaties are very clear that such infringement is permissible only under 
exceptions and limitations to copyrights, and such exceptions and limitations are 
permissible only if they pass the three-step test. This is the point I develop below.
 A first remark is that an exception or limitation to exclusive rights should be a 
general rule, applicable to all, and not a special decision exclusively in favor of a 
63. Ficsor, supra note 26, at 61. On the basis on the context and the debates as ref lected in the records of the 
1967 Stockholm Revision Conference, Mihály Ficsor states “that the concept of ‘special cases’ includes 
two aspects: first, an exception or limitation must be limited as regards to its coverage as no broad 
exception or limitation with a general impact is permitted and, second, it must be also special in the 
sense that there must be a specific and sound legal-political justification for its introduction. ‘Sound 
legal-political justification’ means that exceptions and limitations cannot serve any kind of political 
objective. There is a need for a clear and well-founded justification, such as freedom of expression, 
public information, public education and the like for an author’s rights may not be curtailed in an 
arbitrary way.” Id.
64. See Grimmelmann, supra note 42, at 15 (noting this conflict of interest).
65. Unregistered non-orphan rightsholders form another group whose exclusive rights would be infringed. 
Members of that group who would choose to exploit their rights following the traditional exploitation 
policies, the only one actually represented by the plaintiffs, can be considered as being represented by 
the existing class. However, those members of the group who would rather choose new exploitation 
models not compatible with exploitation policies used by CMOs are not represented and should thus 
constitute a new subclass. This is further analyzed in Part IV of the article.
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single party. As noted by Ficsor, “there must be a specific and sound legal-political 
justification for its introduction”; an international rule, enforced by three treaties, 
cannot take exception favoring one private interest.66
 Even if we were to ignore the Berne Convention’s prohibition on formalities and 
accept the principle of a class action binding rightsholders by default, this would 
hardly be applicable to orphan works because they are excluded by nature from opting 
out, and cannot be represented at any time. Then how could it be possible to rule in 
favor of a settlement that runs contrary to international treaties by allowing a clear 
copyright infringement, without the cover of a recognized exception or limitation? 
Under U.S. law, such a limitation could only exist as some form of fair use because 
there is no other explicit provision for it. However, the GBS Settlement is precisely 
intended to avoid a court deciding whether Google has been acting within the limits 
of fair use regarding all works under copyright, including orphan ones.
 It could be argued that a fair use claim in the GBS Settlement would differ from 
the original fair use claim of the lawsuit. But the difference is mainly that fair use 
would be invoked only for orphan works because, by not opting out, the rightsholders 
of other unregistered works are supposedly agreeing to Google’s exploitation.67 Thus 
an important part of the agreement would still concern the original fair use issues, 
precisely for the very subclass that is not, and cannot be, represented. Furthermore, 
the GBS Settlement involves actual exploitation of the works rather than a simple 
book search service, and fair use can hardly be invoked to justify direct commercial 
exploitation.
 Of course, the United States can introduce new exceptions or limitations, either 
by extending fair use through judicial ruling, which is actually what the GBS 
Settlement tries to avoid, or through an act of Congress, which is what the proposed 
Orphan Works Acts have attempted to do, so far without success.68 This failure can 
even be interpreted e contrario as indicating that there is currently no applicable 
exception or limitation in the U.S. legal system, even limited to the case of orphan 
works and that a court ruling could well run afoul of international regulations. If at 
all possible, introducing new exceptions or limitations would make them available to 
all, thus resolving some of the antitrust aspects of the case.
 From the point of view of U.S. law, the class action strategy chosen by the parties 
seems to be an elegant way of circumventing most legal difficulties.69 The GBS 
Settlement Agreement, if approved, would result in exceptions or limitations to the 
exclusive rights without the explicit consent of rightsholders. But, with respect to 
international treaties, it is immaterial which legal mechanism is invoked to achieve 
66. Ficsor, supra note 26, at 61.
67. In this article, I also dispute the assertion that all rightsholders of non-orphan works are properly 
represented by the CMOs party to the GBS settlement. See supra Part II.A.
68. See, e.g., Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. Copyright Office (Sept. 
25, 2008), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/ (giving a brief account of the U.S. “orphan works” 
legislative effort and its historical motivations).
69. Grimmelmann, supra note 42, at 2 (“Laundering orphan works legislation through a class action lawsuit 
is both a brilliant response to legislative inaction and a dangerous use of the judicial power.”). 
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such a result: any national law or institution that leads to this result should be bound 
by the constraints of the treaties.70 It is not obvious how this settlement could be 
acceptable as is, according to international constraints. However, it is worth 
considering whether it can be amended into a more open solution, i.e., giving no 
specific privilege to anyone, and interpretable as a new allowable exception or 
limitation. Again, whether it is instituted by a class action rather than a legislative 
act seems immaterial from the point of view of international instruments.
 Of course, this concerns all in-copyright books scanned and otherwise exploited 
without explicit permission, i.e., without registration by the rightsholders. However, 
at this point, the discussion is restricted to orphan works alone. So, what would be an 
adequate policy regarding orphan works? Because the policy should conform to the 
principle of exceptions and limitations, the choices should be guided by the three-
step test. Therefore, they:
1. should be limited to a special case;
2.  should not conf lict with the normal exploitation of the work; 
and
3.  should not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightsholder.
 In order to apply these guidelines to the GBS Settlement, we must first understand 
what these three requirements can mean in the case of orphan works, and particularly 
digitized orphan works, because the GBS Settlement is only about digitization and 
digitized works. This requires answering some questions, such as: Why do we want 
an exception or limitation for the special case of orphan works? What are the 
legitimate interests of a creator or a rightsholder who cannot be reached and is most 
likely not to be reachable in the future? What is normal exploitation of the work?
 Regarding the special case of orphan works, the motivation should be clear: no one 
wants them to be “frozen,” i.e., not exploitable, because that would deprive everyone in 
the cultural ecology (e.g., the public, scholars, new authors, and cultural industries) 
without any benefit to the rightsholders. Thus the exception or limitation should 
provide a way of making the work exploitable, even though the rightsholder is not 
available to grant a license to do so, or to collect royalties, as well as meeting the second 
and third steps of the test, and possibly other accepted constraints of copyright law.71
70. Indeed, the very fact that international instruments might be invoked in defense of the exclusive property 
rights of people in the class that is supposed to benefit from the class action settlement gives a strange, 
questionable f lavor to this settlement. It seems that an alternative settlement could have allowed the 
indexing of all works, as well as the sale of digital versions of registered works, when so desired by the 
rightsholders, without infringing the usual exploitation rights of unregistered rightsholders.
71. For example, a generally accepted rule is that the work must have been legally disclosed at some point 
since an author might not want his work disclosed at all. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 77 
(Can.). This does not necessarily mean that the work was previously published. 
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iV. EXpLOitatiOn fEEs
 A. The Payment of Exploitation Fees
 Canadian and Japanese law implement such an exception to the exclusive right to 
an orphan work, in accordance with the Berne Convention, by entrusting the 
management of the orphan work’s rights to a court of justice that can grant non-
exclusive exploitation licenses and fix a fee to be paid to the rightsholder.72 While 
Japan always requires the fee to be paid and kept in escrow, the Canadian copyright 
law is more f lexible: the fee may be nil, may be postponed until the rightsholder 
reappears, or may have to be paid and kept in escrow for the missing rightsholder.
 It must be kept in mind, however, that both laws are quite old (twenty-five years 
for Canada and forty years for Japan) and predate the digital world as we know it; the 
Internet and the possibility of digitally exploiting works without marginal cost was 
not envisioned at the time either was enacted. In fact, both laws are actually seldom 
used.73
 Therefore, imposing a reasonable copyright fee on orphan works exploitation was 
not really an issue at the time these laws were enacted. The entire printing and 
publishing industry started from the fact that exploiting works in a material world 
requires investment and has a non-negligible per unit cost. It is necessarily a business. 
Whether the author benefited from the copyright fee or not, the very existence of the 
fee did change the per-unit cost, but it did not change much the economics of the 
exploitation system and the availability of the works. Furthermore, copyright law 
was addressing professionals:74 in many cases, for professionals, works are much more 
substitutable than they may be for the public or for libraries, and the fee may indeed 
prevent unfair competition of orphan works with non-orphan works.
 This no longer holds true in the digital world, especially where libraries and the 
public are concerned. For them, the works are not substitutable. Whatever they are 
72. Chosakuken-Ho [Copyright Law], Law No. 48 of 1970, § 8, art. 67, 74 (Japan). 
73. Only 46 licenses have been granted since 1970 under the Japanese law. Agency for Cultural Affairs, 
Description of the Past Decisions Result (Japan), available at http://www.bunka.go.jp/1tyosaku/
c-l/results_past.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2010). The Canadian law has done somewhat better with 249 
licenses in twenty years. Copyright Board of Canada, Decisions: Unlocatable Copyright 
Owners, available at http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2010). 
74. See Gervais, supra note 26, at 4–7. Gervais remarks that “copyright rights (and related rights) apply in 
specific cases and, in theory, with the view of organizing access, not denying it,” and that new problems 
are now encountered in the context of the digital world of the Internet “because copyright was used by 
(or against) and transacted between professionals of the copyright industries, such as authors, publishers, 
producers, distributors and professional pirates, not individual end-users.” He discusses this point at 
length in the subsequent discussion, and states for example that “even if the droit d’auteur tradition can 
be seen as a child of the Enlightenment tradition of individual human rights, Josef Kohler made it clear 
that copyright’s purpose was to be used by and between professionals,” Gervais further notes that “in 
many cases, these professionals were intermediaries with no interest in the content itself (i.e., they could 
have sold shoes or food instead of books or music).” While Gervais’s point is mainly to analyze the 
inadequacies or lack of effectiveness of existing copyright law in the digital world, my own point is more 
to show that one cannot use the same economic analysis for professionals and for end-users. Id.
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able to save on works available for free can be spent on works that are not. Making 
orphan works available for free would eliminate the competition with other works, 
rather than increase it.75 This remark should do away with the competition objection, 
though it is not actually a legal issue.
 Regarding the second step of the test, one could argue that orphan works are not 
being exploited at all, and that the issue of conflicting with normal exploitation is 
thus immaterial. However, one could also argue that conflicts should be avoided with 
future exploitation of the work, in the rare cases where the rightsholder reappears. But 
this is an unsolvable question if the purpose is to actually allow the exploitation of the 
work in case the rightsholder does not reappear. Indeed, the very purpose of the 
exception is to enable normal exploitation of the work, so as to preserve the economic 
rights and other interests of the rightsholder as much as makes sense. Thus the only 
meaningful question is to define what normal exploitation may be. Concretely, some 
organization, for example a court in Japan or Canada, must be assigned the 
management of the rights, with the dual task of achieving the stated goals of the 
exception—normally exploiting the works—and not unreasonably prejudicing the 
legitimate interests of the rightsholders, which include their economic rights.
 As noted above, it was considered quite normal twenty or thirty years ago to 
impose a fee on such exploitation, and to request that this fee be escrowed before the 
exploitation began, even though that was not a compulsory rule in Canada. Indeed, 
except for rare cases, paying a fee for exploiting a work was the norm, and the 
economics of any exploitation were such that a reasonable fee had no adverse effect 
on the exploitation. Hence, according to the three-step test, and short of other 
considerations found in other kinds of exceptions or limitations, this was naturally 
part of a normal exploitation permitted under an orphan exception.76
75. The effects of competition are very different depending on whether the concerned goods are substitutable. 
For example, if two compatible—hence substitutable—text processors are available on the same market, 
lowering the price of one, or making it available for free, will reduce the sales revenue of the other, 
because no one needs both. On the other hand, songs and singers are not substitutable; if two singers are 
competing on the market, and one of them decides to give his songs for free, that will leave more 
customer money available for buying the songs of the other singer and possibly increase his revenue. The 
point I am making is that material—non-digitized—exploitation is necessarily a business; hence, works 
are pretty much substitutable when they have the same commercial value, making it more profitable for 
the printer/publisher—actually acting as a gatekeeper—to give preference to works that require no fee at 
the expense of works with known or protected rightsholders. For example, this was observed in the 
nineteenth century, when U.S. copyright did not protect foreign works. Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-
Century British and American Copyright Law, The Victorian Web, http://www.victorianweb.org/
authors/dickens/pva/pva74.html (last modified Jan. 5, 2001). When dealing directly with the public, as 
is possible with digitized works over the Internet, the works are generally no longer substitutable, and 
the absence of a fee for orphan works will leave more purchasing power for other works. In addition, it 
should be recalled that the very purpose of copyright is to promote original creation. U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Substitutability is hardly the hallmark of original creation in literary 
work; it should not call for special economic protection beyond that already provided by copyright.
76. Even at that time, one could still have questioned whether the exploitation license should be conditioned 
on just fixing a price to be paid to resurfacing rightsholders, or whether the fee had necessarily to be 
escrowed, which raised the question of its use when not claimed.
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 However, as Mihály Ficsor remarked, changing technology changes the 
conditions of exploitation, thus also changing what a normal exploitation may be, 
and that necessarily alters the interpretation of the three-step test.77 Indeed, in the 
context of digital exploitation of works (which is the only one directly related to the 
GBS Settlement), we are dealing with new economic structures that allow exploitation 
with no marginal cost to the exploiting party. This is not the only possible mode of 
exploitation, of course, but it has become one of the normal forms of exploitation of 
works, literary or otherwise. Furthermore, the absence of significant marginal cost 
has led many authors (or rightsholders) to make their works freely available on the 
Internet. Examples include the ever-growing open access to academic literature,78 the 
77. Ficsor, supra note 26, at 39–40.
Digital technology, and in particular the ever more widespread use of the Internet, on 
the one hand, has raised complex challenges to the rightsholders, and on the other 
hand, individual exercise of rights—through the application of technological protection 
measures (TPMs), electronic rights management information (RMI), and their 
combination as complex digital rights management systems (DRMs)—has become 
possible and practical in a broadening field. This inf luences the scope of those 
exceptions to and limitations of exclusive rights that may be justified and acceptable on 
the basis of the “three-step test” provided for in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention 
for the protection of literary and artistic works (Berne Convention), Article 13 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement), Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and Article 16 of the 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). For example, the distribution 
of copies through interactive transmissions supported by DRM—resulting in what is 
regarded now as “private copying”—is becoming a basic form of exploitation of works; 
therefore, in the cases where rightsholders apply DRM systems, and in particular 
TPMs, it would not be in accordance with the requirements of the “three-step test” to 
reduce the exclusive right of reproduction, in general, to a mere right to remuneration.
 Id. It should however be remarked that this analysis does not hold regarding DRMs, as they have since 
proved largely ineffective technically and even counter-productive socially and commercially. 
Nevertheless, this does not affect Ficsor’s fundamental point that changes in the technology may modify 
the possible forms of exploitation, and “this inf luences the scope of those exceptions to and limitations 
of exclusive rights that may be justified and acceptable on the basis of the ‘three-step test.’” Id. 
78. See Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, Earlham Coll., http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/fos/overview.
htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010). Open access developed primarily with periodicals, but many books of 
all types are now published under open access licenses. Id. The importance of open access in the 
academic world is strongly argued in the context of the Google Book Settlement in a letter sent to the 
court by academic authors:
As the UC Academic Council letter to the court in this matter explains, the proposed 
Settlement Agreement “does not explicitly acknowledge that academic authors might 
want to make their books, particularly out-of-print books, freely available under a 
Creative Commons or other open access license. We think it is especially likely that 
academic authors of orphan books would favor public domain or Creative Commons-
type licensing if it were possible for them to make such a choice through a convenient 
mechanism.” If the Authors Guild had been truly representing the interests of academic 
authors during the negotiations leading up to the Settlement Agreement, it would have 
recognized and insisted upon open access options for academic authors.
 Letter from Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law & Info., Univ. of Cal., to Judge Denny Chin (Sept. 3, 
2009), http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/samuelson.pdf (quoting a letter from Mary Croughan, 
Chair of the Academic Council of the Univ. of Cal., et al., to J. Michael McMahon (Aug. 13, 2009), 
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free availability in digital form of the novels by the popular science fiction author 
Cory Doctorow,79 and the set of high school mathematics textbooks developed by 
Sésamath,80 available in both print and digital form. Moreover, we are only witnessing 
the beginning stages of this evolution.
 Actually, many authors get more indirect benefits from the larger audience made 
possible by such new models than they might get by making their works available for 
a fee. In Jacobsen v. Katzer, open access, or free use of copyrighted works, was 
recognized as a relevant economic model for software.81 Hence, even in the restricted 
economic interpretation of the World Trade Organization panel,82 open access is a 
normal exploitation in the sense of the second step,83 with its own economic 
importance for the authors or rightsholders.
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/reports/8_13_09_Council%20Members2Court_
Google%20book%20search%20settlement_FINAL.pdf.
79. Cory Doctorow, Craphound, http://www.craphound.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2010) (offering free 
downloads of Cory Doctorow’s regularly published novels in a variety of official formats and as fan-
created translations.).
80. Sésamath, http://www.sesamath.net/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
81. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“There are substantial benefits, including 
economic benefits, to the creation and distribution of copyrighted works under public licenses that 
range far beyond traditional license royalties. For example, program creators may generate market share 
for their programs by providing certain components free of charge.”). The court decision includes a long 
discussion of the increasing role of open exploitation of works, not limited to software, noting that it 
“serves to advance the arts and sciences in a manner and at a pace that few could have imagined just a 
few decades ago.” Id. at 1378.
82. See Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.pdf; see also Request for the Establishment of a 
Panel by the European Communities and their Member States, Annex I, WT/DS160/5 (Apr. 16, 1999), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234db.pdf (interpreting the three-step test as 
predominantly economic); see also Christopher Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of 
Copyright Law to the Information Society, UNESCO e-Copyright Bulletin (Jan.–Mar. 2007), http://
portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/34481/11883823381test_trois_etapes_en.pdf/test_trois_etapes_en.pdf.
83. Ficsor, supra note 26, at 61–62.
What requires interpretation in this context is rather the adjective “normal.” It may be 
understood in two different ways: either as an empirical conclusion about what is 
common in a given context, or as an indication of some normative standards. The 
records of the Stockholm Revision Conference, in the form of the following statement, 
clearly indicate that the latter meaning was taken into account: “all forms of exploiting 
a work, which have, or likely to acquire, considerable economic or practical importance, must 
be reserved to the authors.”
 Id. (emphasis added). See Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, supra note 56, at 112.
With technological development, it is becoming even clearer that the adjective “normal” 
simply cannot be of a mere descriptive, empirical nature, and that it is rather a normative 
requirement. New means and forms of reproduction keep emerging, and when, at the 
beginning, they are applied for the first time, certainly it would be difficult to speak 
about a form of exploitation that might be described—in the empirical sense of the 
word—as “usual,” “typical” or “ordinary.” At the same time, these new forms of 
reproduction may be very important for the owners of copyright to extract market value 
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 One can make an even stronger case, though not an economic one, where orphan 
works are concerned. Because experience shows that the rightsholders seldom 
reappear, the only interest they may have in the work is their intellectual influence, 
even anonymous, and the memory or fame that the work may associate with their 
name. Most likely, they will never benefit from whatever fee could be extracted from 
the exploitation of the works. Any unnecessary constraint, whether legal or economic, 
that restricts the exploitation of their work will then unreasonably prejudice their 
only remaining legitimate interests, as well as defeat the very purpose of an orphan 
works exception, thus undermining the justification of its very existence.84
 This is not to say that the economic interests of the unreachable rightsholders 
should be ignored, but is to say that they should be considered in a balanced way, 
compatible with all models of normal exploitation of the works, as was indeed 
proposed in the Orphan Works Acts.85 One characteristic of these Acts was that 
they did not require any actual payment unless claimed by the rightsholder.86 Hence, 
claiming a fee would still remain the decision of the rightsholder, and all models of 
exploitation would be left open until one appears. Indeed, the currently proposed 
variants for an Orphan Works Act appear to be the closest one can get to a balanced 
exception to the exclusive rights for orphan works, with due consideration of the 
three-step test in the current technological environment.87
 However, the implementation of such a requirement would be difficult. 
Specifically, if digitized works are to be made available over the Internet, then 
keeping track of all the people who get a copy of a work, so as to make them pay 
individually at some later time if the rightsholder is found, seems very difficult, 
unreliable, costly, and is likely to entail intractable privacy issues.88 Therefore, the 
solution of fixing a price that may have to be paid should probably be reserved for 
from the right of reproduction, the more so because they usually replace some other, 
more traditional forms.
 Id. 
84. With respect to digital exploitation of orphan works, rightsholders generally means the author or his 
inheritors because, in most cases, no digital rights were ever granted for the simple reason that they did 
not exist at the time the rightsholders could be located.
85. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act, supra note 23; Orphan Works Act of 2008, supra note 23.
86. See supra note 23. Article 77 of the Canadian Copyright Act does not require prior escrow of payment, 
but leaves the choice to the license issuing court, who usually requires it. Japanese Copyright Law 
requires prior payment, as did the French Senate Bill pertaining to orphan visual works. See infra note 
112. These laws bring more security to users than the Orphan Acts because a license is actually issued 
after checking the diligence of the search for rightsholders, and the licensing fee is fixed at that time. 
Postponing payment until it is claimed by the rightsholder would make them compatible with more 
exploitation policies.
87. See Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act, supra note 23; Orphan Works Act of 2008, supra note 23. 
However, this is not intended as an assessment of all other aspects of the proposed Orphan Works 
Acts.
88. Though it does require prior payment, the Google online access scheme also entails unacceptable privacy 
issues, which represented authors could well find objectionable regarding their own work.
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cases where the work is further exploited commercially rather than just accessed by 
end users.89
 Indeed, in the case of accessibility of orphan works via a Google server, Google 
is actually the party exploiting the works commercially, even when not actually 
selling copies. Given that Google does turn a profit from such an exploitation, as 
admitted in the proposed Settlement Agreement, part of this profit could be used to 
cover the rare claims of authors who reappear, rather than given without cause to 
parties who have no rights to those works.90
 Regarding the definition of the classes in this class action, some remarks based 
on the discussions of this section and the end of Part II.A above are necessary:91
•	 	In	 the	new	context	of	dissemination	of	digitized	work	over	 the	
Internet, the CMOs constituting one party to the class action 
represent only those rightsholders who wish to exploit their rights 
by perceiving royalties in the traditional publishing way. They 
cannot claim to be representing rightsholders who use other 
means to exploit or disseminate their work. The compatibility of 
new copyright management models with existing CMOs has 
been analyzed in the French context in a CSPLA committee.92 
This work led to negative conclusions for several reasons.93 In 
 
89. This may seem abusive. However it is practically the existing situation in the United States regarding 
works that are not registered with the copyright office. Because § 412 of the Copyright Act then 
excludes statutory damages and attorney fees, even for non-U.S. works, the legal protection against 
individual infringements is not cost-effective.
90. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 4.5(a)(ii) (“Net Advertising Revenues. Google shall pay to the 
Registry, on behalf of the Rightsholders, the Standard Revenue Split for Advertising. The ‘Standard 
Revenue Split for Advertising,’ paid by Google to Rightsholders, through the Registry, is seventy 
percent (70%) of Net Advertising Revenues.”). The original intent of the Google Book Search project 
was to extract revenue only from advertising.
91. See discussion supra note 38. It should be recalled that the technical and economic changes that led to 
this analysis are precisely the same ones that now allow the new type of practices that led to the GBS 
Settlement. It would therefore make little sense to assess the Settlement Agreement without taking into 
account all the known consequences of this new context on the copyright ecology. Returning to the 
physicist view of footnote 38, this would be akin to analyzing an ice processing device on the basis of the 
physical laws governing liquid water.
92. See La Mise à Disposition Ouverte des Oeuvres de l’Esprit, Rapport de la Commission spécialisée sur la 
mise à disposition ouverte des oeuvres de l’esprit, § 69–77, Valérie-Laure Benabou et Joëlle Farchy 
(Présidentes), Damien Botteghi (Rapporteur), Conseil Supérieur de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique 
(CSPLA) [Open Availability of Works of the Mind, Report of the Specialized Commission on Open 
Availability of Works, Valérie-Laure Benabou and Joëlle Farchy (Presidents), Damien Botteghi 
(Reporter), High Council on Artistic and Literary Property], June 2007, http://www.cspla.culture.gouv.
fr/CONTENU/miseadiposouverterapp.pdf.
93. Id. The relations between open access and CMOs are analysed in id. ch. 3.1., 3.2, § 69–77. For a 
summary, see id. § 10 of the findings at the end of the report: “L’articulation des licences ouvertes avec 
la gestion collective est, en l’état des pratiques, problématique. . . [Les SPRD] considèrent que les 
systèmes de mise à disposition ouverte ne sont pas compatibles avec leurs règles actuelles de 
fonctionnement, . . . .” [“Coordination of open licensing and collective management is problematic in 
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particular it should be noted that traditional CMOs (like those 
involved in the GBS Settlement) need resources to operate, and 
that this is not straightforwardly compatible with new rights 
management models.
•	 	Given	that	CMOs	can	represent	only	“traditional”	rightsholders,	
there is no way to know whether the rightsholder of an orphan 
work would choose to have his rights managed in the CMO way, 
or would rather use a new rights management model for exploiting 
his works. Therefore, no one knows whether he is adequately 
represented in the class action.
•	 	In	the	specific	situation	of	orphan	works,	our	analysis	shows	that	
the remaining interest of authors (or their heirs) is better served by 
new exploitation models based on open access than by an exploitation 
restricted by financial constraints. Even when the rights have been 
transferred, the unreachable rightsholder has nothing to win, while 
the author has much to lose. But authors or rightsholders of orphan 
works are unlikely to speak for themselves.
•	 	It	is,	of	course,	in	the	best	interest	of	the	CMOs	that	are	party	to	
the class action to settle successfully by asserting that they 
represent the whole gamut of concerned rightsholders. They also 
have a clear f inancial interest in including true orphan 
rightsholders, or even unwary authors (often precisely those who 
do not wish to enforce their copyright) in the registry so as to 
benefit from their works.
 B. Exploiting Unregistered Works
 The preceding analysis is about orphan works only, and several commentators 
have expressed their own concern about the role and future of orphan works in this 
settlement. Unfortunately, there is often some confusion about the type or scope of 
the works concerned. So far, the analysis has distinguished three types of works: 
public domain, orphan works (which are always in-copyright), and in-copyright, 
non-orphan works. But this is inconsistent with the GBS Settlement which considers 
a different classification: public domain, unregistered, and registered works.94
the current state of practices. . . . [CMOs] estimate that open access systems are not compatible with 
their current operating procedures, . . . .”].
94. Throughout this document, the words “registered” and “unregistered” apply to a work ’s (or a 
rightsholder’s) registration with the Books Rights Registry under the GBS Settlement Agreement. See 
Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, art. VI. When registration with the Copyright Office is meant, it 
will be made explicit.
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 Indeed, the GBS Settlement Agreement is a denial of the existence of orphan 
works.95 Although it is found in the title of many commentaries about the GBS 
Settlement Agreement, the word “orphan” itself appears only four times in the whole 
document, including attachments, and only in reference to the possibility of a future 
Orphan Works Act.96 This is somewhat surprising, given the recent and considerable 
worldwide interest in orphan works, particularly in the context of the settlement. But 
this may be explained by the analysis below, which also supports dissenting views of 
what should be done with unregistered works.
 Based on the above analysis and the GBS Settlement Agreement, there are 
actually four types of works and corresponding rightsholders:
1. public domain: no rightsholders;
2. (in-copyright) orphan: unreachable, inactive rightsholders;
3. unregistered non-orphan: reachable, inactive rightsholders; and
4. registered: active rightsholders.
The unregistered works are thus composed of a mix of all orphan works and some of 
the in-copyright, non-orphan works whose rightsholders could be found if one were 
willing to pay the cost of a diligent search.97
 Much of the literature about the settlement has somehow equated orphan works 
with unregistered works by considering all unregistered in-copyright works as 
orphan, including all works willfully or unwittingly ignored by their rightsholders.98 
But the accepted definition operates the other way around: it is up to a prospective 
user to diligently seek the rightsholders, and he may find them even though they did 
not know they had any such rights.
 The confusion between unregistered and orphan is quite understandable. Many 
people feel instinctively, and probably rightly, that the concept of orphan works, and 
95. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7. This denial is to be expected. The rightsholders of orphan 
works are by definition unable to speak for themselves, and the settlement is based on the presumption 
that all works have rightsholders that can opt out in order to have their work treated differently. If the 
existence of orphan works and orphan rightsholders were recognized for what they actually are, they 
would form a class of their own so that their specific interests would have to be taken into consideration, 
and, as we have shown, these interests may differ from those of other rightsholders. See supra notes 
91–93 and accompanying text. 
96. The four instances of the word “orphan” are related to provisions regarding a future amendment of the 
U.S. Copyright Act to allow use of orphan works. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, §§ 3.8(b), 7.2(b)
(v); see also Attachment I to Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 
05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2008), § I, available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/settlement/
OriginalSettlementAttachments/Attachment-I-Notice-of-Class-Action-Settlement.pdf.
97. To make things even more complicated, it is not always easy, or even possible, to determine whether a 
work is still in copyright. However, this is probably a less important issue, which we shall ignore for the 
sake of simplicity.
98. Peter Hirtle, Why the Google Books Settlement is Better Than Orphan Works Legislation, LibraryLaw 
Blog (May 27, 2009), http://blog.librarylaw.com/librarylaw/2009/05/why-the-google-books-
settlement-is-better-than-orphan-works-legislation.html.
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any legislation based upon this concept, “simply wouldn’t do much good . . . because 
the cost of a ‘diligent effort’ is not going to be cheap.”99 Hence they prefer to rely on 
the rightsholder’s explicit interest, expressed through registration. The confusion 
may also stem from a memory of the opt-in copyright system that was used in the 
United States until 1976: the U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 avoided orphan works and 
was somewhat similar to the registry system of the GBS Settlement Agreement.100 
The main difference is that, under the pre-1976 copyright system, unregistered works 
were left in the public domain, which is not the case with the proposed Registry, 
under which works will not be freely accessible to the public.101 Finally the observed 
confusion could simply result from an inadvertent identification of the two partitions 
of works in three types, public domain, orphan, and in-copyright non-orphan on the 
one hand, and public domain, unregistered, and registered on the other hand.
 The GBS Settlement Agreement is itself the best reason not to make a distinction 
between orphan works and unregistered works. The works in consideration are 
essentially part of the “long tail” of works that will be exploited only in digital 
form.102 Because this form of exploitation of works is permitted by the Settlement 
Agreement without the permission of the works’ rightsholder and for the benefit of 
Google and the registered rightsholders, no one will ever have an incentive to search 
for the works’ rightsholders, diligently or otherwise—even though the GBS 
Settlement Agreement makes a weak statement that the Registry “will attempt to 
locate Rightsholders with respect to Books and Inserts,”103 without further indication 
as to the means.104 Hence, for all practical purposes, there is no useful distinction to 
be made between unregistered and orphan, whether for works or rightsholders.
99. Lawrence Lessig, Little Orphan Artworks, N.Y. Times, May 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/05/20/opinion/20lessig.html. Lessig’s comment is indeed supported by the very small number 
of orphan licenses that have been requested or awarded in both Canada and Japan. See supra note 73.
100. See Notice of Inquiry, 70 Fed. Reg. 3739, 3739–40 (Jan. 26, 2005).
101. Another confusion to be avoided is “free” or “open access” vs. “public domain.” While public domain is 
a permanent legal status of works, free access is a policy chosen by the rightsholder, or imposed by a 
legal device such as an exception or limitation. With the possible exception of moral rights, the public 
domain is unrestricted. But a free access policy may have restrictions, for example, regarding commercial 
exploitation or derived works. See Suber, supra note 78. This article suggests that allowing free access in 
some situations is in the interest of both the rightsholders and the public. It is not intended to address 
possible changes regarding the public domain. A more subtle point is that a free/open access can prohibit 
a third party from making the same work available elsewhere. However, inasmuch as the intention here 
is not to impose the burden of making available on anyone, openness must include the right to make 
available (for as long as the rightsholder does not step in). When necessary, a search engine can find out 
where a work has been made available. 
102. See Chris Anderson, The Long Tail, Wired, Oct. 2004, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.10/
tail.html.
103. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 6.1(c).
104. Actually, one could consider using the revenue of unregistered rightsholders to perform the diligent 
search to find some of them. But it is not clear that the revenue would be sufficient to help significantly, 
given their expected number of approximately 4.75 million unregistered books, about two-thirds of the 
scanned corpus, according to Peter Brantley’s evaluation. Peter Brantley, The Orphan Monopoly, Peter 
Brantley’s Thoughts & Speculations (Mar. 15, 2009), http://blogs.lib.berkeley.edu/shimenawa.
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 The obvious consequence is that most of what has been said about orphan works, 
here or in other analyses of the GBS Settlement, applies to all unregistered works as 
well. This is certainly true of the conclusion in Part IV.A above that the best interest 
of rightsholders is to have a larger public, even a non-paying one, when the situation 
is such that they will not receive any copyright fee. Given that when not being paid, 
it is better for an author (and not any worse for an indifferent rightsholder) to have 
greater public access to the work, the default situation should be to leave the works 
freely available to the public because those rightsholders who wish to be paid can 
register while those whose interest is not to be paid often cannot make it known.105 
Of course, the practical details need to be worked out. For example, free access could 
be put on hold for, perhaps, five years to give rightsholders the time to react to the 
change and register if they choose.
 The absence of significant differences between non-orphan unregistered works 
and orphan works may also be relevant to an antitrust analysis of the settlement 
based on the fact that, short of a class action, it is impossible to contract with the 
rightsholders of orphan works. It may be possible to contract with the non-orphan 
unregistered rightsholders; however, this would require a diligent search for all 
unregistered rightsholders, including the rightsholders of all orphans works, because 
one cannot know the difference beforehand. This would make the cost of contracting 
separately with all non-orphan rightsholders so high that doing so could only be seen 
as a theoretical possibility, not a practical one, even assuming these rightsholders 
would be willing to contract. These close similarities between orphan and unregistered 
works certainly contribute to the previously discussed terminology confusion. 
However, there are legal differences with respect to international instruments that 
cannot be ignored.
 The original and only purpose of the Google Book Search project was the 
creation of a book search index. Such an index does require a blanket license for 
scanning copies of the works.106 Furthermore, these copies are really technical “non 
consumptive” copies, and their use is specific enough that it may be considered a 
limitation on, or an exception to, the rightsholders’ exclusive rights (the first step of 
the three-step test). In addition, an index easily passes the rest of the three-step test 
because, at worst, it improves the normal exploitation of the work without prejudicing 
php/2009/03/15/the-orphan-monopoly. Hence it seems wiser to look for another more effective solution. 
However, it is conspicuous that the authors of the GBS Settlement Agreement had only other uses in 
mind for that resource. 
105. See infra Section IV.C for further discussion of this point.
106. The blanket license is needed to avoid “the enormous cost associated with trying to track down copyright 
owners to ask their permission, especially for out-of-print and orphan works.” Bisk, supra note 62, at 
297. As discussed in Part II.A, this is a typical situation for Extended Collective Licensing, which is 
what the opt-out solution would amount to, provided it is available to all competitors and given that the 
revenue is shared. See supra notes 27–35 and accompanying text. But exceptions and limitations do not 
necessarily require a sharing of revenue, fair use is an example, and it can even be disputed whether the 
technical digital copy needed is an infringement.
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the interests of rightsholders in any significant way.107 Furthermore, it is also 
significantly useful for the public.108 Of course, turning the creation of a book search 
index into an allowable exception or limitation would imply that it is a permissible 
undertaking for anyone, thus eliminating any antitrust issues.
 Hence a U.S. court could recognize, within the constraints of international 
treaties, that the building of an index for the book search project is a form of fair use. 
Alternatively, a specific limitation could be instituted by Congress. Google was 
arguably within the range allowed by international law,109 provided it was implemented 
by U.S. law, and still is regarding the book search part of the GBS Settlement 
Agreement. Scanning the works to make them available in digital form, known as 
Display Uses,110 is a more complex matter. There is of course no problem for registered 
works, when scanning is done according to the wishes of the rightsholders. For 
orphan works, which are necessarily unregistered, there seems to be a consensus (at 
least for textual works)111 that scanning is a special case that could be handled by an 
appropriate exception or limitation.112 We have seen, however, that there is a lack of 
consensus regarding how to implement this exception or limitation.
 The remaining case is that of non-orphan, unregistered (in-copyright) works. 
The first observation is that there is nothing specific about these works, other than 
having been scanned or being subject to scanning, by Google. Making these works 
available, with or without payment, on paper or on the Internet, is a normal and basic 
107. Actually, indexing of copyrighted works has been an accepted practice on the Web since the first search 
engines began to operate fifteen years ago. In order to facilitate opt-out, a robot exclusion protocol was 
developed—long before Google came into existence—and is now one of the oldest standards of the 
Web. Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, The Web Robots Pages, http://www.robotstxt.
org/wc/robots.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2010). Content providers are actually vying to be the most 
well-indexed, to such an extent that helping them to improve their search visibility has become a 
profitable activity, and that indexing algorithms include safeguards against individual attempts for 
better indexation. 
108. It probably is a good example of the “new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital 
network environment” that are provided for in Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, as 
commented in the agreed statement concerning Article 10. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 15, art. 10.
109. Jennifer Suzanne Bresson Bisk does not quite agree with this conclusion regarding the initial Book 
Search that led to the class action. Bisk, supra note 62. 
110. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.48.
111. The visual artists object to the creation of such an exception or limitation, but their objections are 
related more to their perception of the defense of the interests of rightsholders of non-orphan visual 
works than to the criteria of the three-step test. See supra note 49.
112. The approach considered in France is allegedly not an exception or limitation, because no such exception 
or limitation is permitted by the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2001, supra note 2. An Orphan Works legislation, derived from the CSPLA Report, supra 
note 39, which for the most part failed to pass in the French Senate, tried to circumvent the issue with 
a dubious legal device intended to be similar to an already existing one called “gestion d’affaire.” Loi 441 
du 12 mai 2010 relative aux oeuvres visuelles orphelines et modifiant le code de la propriété intellectuelle 
[Senate Bill pertaining to orphan visual works and modifying the intellectual property code], Journal 
Officiel de la République Français [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France] May 12, 2010. http://www.senat.
fr/leg/ppl09-441.html. The bill is now reduced to a simple definition of orphan works.
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form of exploitation that does not call for any specific provision. In other words, 
there is no reason that might justify an exception to, or limitation on, a rightsholder’s 
exclusive rights for exploiting digitized versions if the work is not known to be an 
orphan work.
 There is, however, a way out for some works. Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, 
precluding formalities for the enjoyment and the exercise of the rights, does not 
apply in the country of origin of the work.113 Thus, whenever the country of origin is 
the United States, i.e. for United States works, formalities can be imposed for the 
enjoyment and the exercise of exclusive rights so that the settlement can indeed be 
implemented. 114 Of course, this obviously applies also to U.S. orphan works, so that 
no specific exception or limitation was really needed for them, at least where 
international agreements are concerned.115 However, the works covered under the 
GBS Settlement are not all U.S. works, so this is only a partial solution. For example, 
a book by a U.S. author, even registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, but published 
for the first time simultaneously in the United States and in Canada, will have 
Canada as its country of origin.
 This leads us to another classification of works:116
1. U.S. works not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office;
2. U.S. works registered with the U.S. Copyright Office; and
3.  Works that are not U.S. works, but are subject to a Copyright 
Interest in the United States.117
 The definition of a “Book” in the GBS Settlement Agreement is explicitly limited 
to the latter two kinds (provided they are in-copyright).118 A “ jurisdictional” 
interpretation by the courts of the registration requirement in § 411 of the Copyright 
Act prevents the inclusion of the first kind of works.119 And these works can be safely 
excluded under § 412.
113. Berne Convention, art. 5(3), supra note 21.
114. Id.
115. This is apparently why Lawrence Lessig suggested solving the orphan works problem for U.S. works by 
requiring registration, rather than the Orphan Works Act. See Lessig, supra note 99.
116. The GBS Settlement Agreement actually uses this classification for works as they stood on the Notice 
Commencement Date of the proposed Settlement. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.16. 
117. “Copyright Interest” is defined in the Settlement Agreement. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, 
§ 1.38.
118. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.16.
119. James Grimmelmann, An Informal Rant About Formalities, The Laboratorium (Jan. 2, 2009, 4:07 
PM), http://www.laboratorium.net/archive/2009/01/02/an_informal_rant_about_formalities.
141
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
 Figure 1: A chart summarizing the different cases to be considered in the analysis 
of a structure like that to be created by the GBS Settlement. Rows and columns 
define the legal copyright status of a work, as indicated in their first cell, with respect 
to the structure analyses (that of the GBS Settlement here), the U.S. Copyright Act 
and the Berne Convention. Each of the twelve center cells corresponds to a case 
having the legal characteristics specified in its row and column. The last cell of a row 
or column indicates how the corresponding legal status can be dealt with, and/or the 
nature of existing legal constraints.
 This last cell of a row (respectively, the last column) has a light gray background if 
the corresponding legal status itself offers no way to deal with works in that row 
(respectively, column), though the intersecting column (respectively, row) may provide 
a solution. The dark gray cell corresponds to the case when neither the row nor the 
column offers a legal way of including the work. The cell above is marked light gray 
and impractical because, though the row does offer an escape, it is difficult and costly 
to establish that this row (orphan) actually applies, i.e., that the work is orphan. Blank 
cells correspond to the cases of work that can be included legally by some means.
 Note that the column “U.S. Work Unregistered with Copyright Office” is marked 
here as simply excluded from the GBS Settlement Agreement because the status is 
incompatible with a class action, as explained in the text. But it would have to be 
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 Combining these two classifications of works, as done in Figure 1, shows that 
the formality problem remains only for unregistered works that are not U.S. works. 
This is very precisely what Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention is supposed to avoid. 
It is somewhat disconcerting that Congress would go through such efforts and legal 
disruption to adapt the U.S. Copyright Act to the constraints of the Berne 
Convention—and the other international agreements that include the Berne 
Convention’s substantive articles—only to have its will and the corresponding 
legislative work circumvented by a class action lawsuit.
 One simple solution would be to exclude from digital exploitation under the 
settlement all works other than U.S. works, unless their rightsholders choose to 
register with the Books Rights Registry (BRR) created by the Settlement 
Agreement.120 After all, the settlement already excludes U.S. works that have not 
been registered with the U.S. Copyright Office—apparently more to accommodate 
the effects of § 411 of the Copyright Act than to implement a consistent choice. This 
does not necessarily preclude indexing these non-U.S. works, which is legally 
defensible, as discussed above. Furthermore, it is clearly not in the interest of 
rightsholders or authors to be excluded from a major book search index, and one 
could imagine situations when they would actually pay for the service, which is not 
that different from the marketing and advertising paid for in traditional publishing.
 A more constructive and global solution would have to be an international one: to 
keep the existing prohibition on formalities outside the country of origin, but to 
institute a single worldwide international books database where rights should be 
declared before they can be exercised.121 This is now technologically feasible, and would 
essentially solve problems, for all countries, with minimal change to existing 
legislation.122 And it would also be a greater resource for scholars and culture in general, 
than the already acclaimed Books Database of the GBS Settlement Agreement.
 C. Enforcing the Exploitation Fee
 From the analysis in the previous Part of this article, it appears that, though their 
legal status may be different, there may not be much of a practical distinction between 
orphan works and unregistered works. The difference is largely dependent on the 
definition of “diligent search,” which may be more or less “reasonably diligent.” In 
120. See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, at §§ 1.19, 7.2(b)(v). A close approximation of this 
solution was actually adopted in the Amended Settlement Agreement. Regarding orphan works, an 
adequate exception or limitation could theoretically allow keeping their exploitation in the Settlement 
Agreement, but it is not really practical to do it on a large scale, given the cost of their identification. 
121. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5. To keep in line with article 5 of the Berne Convention, this 
should be required only for works that have Earth as planet of origin.
122. Press Release, Viviane Reding, European Union Comm’r for Telecoms & Media Digital Europe, The 
Ludwig Erhard Lecture (July 9, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer
ence=SPEECH/09/336&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Viviane Reding 
has already been suggesting such an international registry for European countries, to include all orphan 
and out of print works. The suggestion does not give details on the modalities regarding the uses of that 
registry. Id. 
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other words, there is a continuum, which suggests, as I have already observed, that 
policies appropriate for orphan works might be worth considering for all unregistered 
works, provided these policies can be made legally acceptable. Hence, I first consider 
the case of orphan works, for which there is a fairly large consensus that an exception 
or limitation could be appropriate, even though there may not be a consensus on the 
modalities and, specifically, on the payment of an exploitation fee.
  1. The Case of Orphan Works
 Fixing a license fee to be paid immediately to the trustee for the use of an orphan 
work is, of course, meaningless if there is no provision to enforce the payment. The 
French lobby on orphan works is aware of the issue, and their choice of CMOs for 
the trusteeship of orphan works is explicitly intended to make sure that the trustee 
will have the right and the will to prevent unauthorized uses of these orphan works.123 
Otherwise, any would-be exploiter would have no strong incentive to actually pay 
the trustee, especially after performing a diligent search (considered compulsory in 
any case) indicating that the rightsholder is unlikely to ever be found. Actually, 
things are somewhat more complex, as enforcement has unexpected counter-
productive aspects. It is an incentive to ignore the diligent search altogether, at least 
for minor exploitations of works that seem likely to be orphan, because no one is then 
likely to be legally able to enforce payment. Alternatively, it is an incentive not to 
publish the result of a fruitless search, because the trustee organization is powerless 
to request the fee as long as the orphan status is not effectively known to it, and it 
would most likely be unwilling to pay on its own the cost of a diligent search.124
123. Les oeuvres Orphelines dans le Secteur de l’Écrit, Groupe de travail CFC, at 4 [CFC Working Group, 
Orphan Works in the Publishing Sector,], note d’étape, 2 octobre 2007 [Progress Note, Oct. 2, 2007], 
http://www.datcha.net/orphan/documents/france/CFC-NOTE-D-ETAPE-2007.10.02.pdf.
124. Enforcement of the prohibition of uses without explicit authorization from rightsholders seems seldom 
accounted for in the literature. Many countries have no provision for it, while others do allow it, but 
with quite different modalities. Looking for examples in the Nordic countries, which seem to have 
similar approaches to these issues, we see significant differences. This prohibition can be enforced in 
Norway by organizations in charge of Extended Collective Licensing, “in the absence of any objection 
from the right holder.” Copyright Act (Act No. 2 of May 12, 1961) (Norway) c. 2, §38(b), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129004.
  In Sweden, enforcement can be requested “by a party that, on the basis of a license, has the right to 
exploit the work.” Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works 2009, c. 7, art. 53(b) (Sweden), 
available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/download/20edd6df.pdf?major=1&minor=15195&cn=attachment
Duplicator_0_attachment. In Denmark, enforcement is “at the instance of the aggrieved party,” which 
seems to mean the rightsholders. Consolidated Act on Copyright (No. 202, 2010), c. 7, § 81(1) 
(Denmark), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=191420. However, exclusive 
rights are generally understood as covering both the right to authorize and the right to prohibit, which 
is natural since the right to prohibit can open the door to forms of censorship—explicitly allowed for 
Governments only by Article 17 of the Berne Convention, which indicates e contrario that it is not 
allowed for anyone else. This understanding is made explicit as “the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit” in the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001, 
supra note 2. Swedish law is apparently not compliant. The exclusive character of the right to prohibit is 
even more important in the digital world, where an increasing number of authors wish to have their 
work widely disseminated and read, rather than be paid and have to manage authorizations. This 
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 Of course, none of this should occur if the minimalist principle is followed.125 As 
I argued above, imposing payment of license fees not claimed by the rightsholders 
defeats the very purpose of an orphan exception or limitation without benefiting the 
rightsholders. It would also be a further infringement on the exclusive rights of the 
orphan works rightsholder to grant any organization the right to enforce such 
payment. Again, that would be detrimental to the purpose of the exception without 
benefit to the rightsholders. Thus it clearly should be avoided. This line of reasoning 
also applies to the use of technical devices to control the dissemination of works, 
such as digital rights management tools (DRM).126 Using such devices without 
explicit consent from the rightsholders would be a further infringement on the 
exercise of their exclusive rights, and it would be defeating rather than furthering the 
purpose of an orphan exception. Hence, while Google has the right to use such 
devices on public domain works, it should be restrained from doing so on orphan 
works, as is the declared intent of their technical business model.127 However this 
question is probably largely rhetorical because it is doubtful whether there exists any 
technical means to control the dissemination of the written word. Unlike most other 
works, text is naturally digital, since writing was invented, and it can be reproduced 
without loss of information if it can be read at all. At worst, this can be made 
inconvenient. Nevertheless, the question is not so rhetorical where privacy issues are 
concerned, given the technical remote access model intended by the clauses of the 
GBS Settlement Agreement. Actually, like all forms of DRM or other digital control, 
this is just another incentive to access works by other channels.128 This does not 
mean that Google cannot require payment or make advertising profit for the service 
of making works available online, which they intended to digitize anyway for 
indexing purposes, but only that they cannot exert further control over those works, 
nor differentiate the payment according to the nature of the works.
  2. The Case of Unregistered Works
 The situation is naturally a bit different when considering all unregistered works. 
I assume that their Display Use is somehow made legal by some device, such as a 
registry, whether that of the settlement or an international one as I suggested. Even 
though I am no longer considering a limitation or exception, nor a special case as 
management is far from obvious to many authors, especially when considering that the legal status of 
automated licensing often remains to be clarified.
125. See supra Part II.C.
126. Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Relating to 
Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 317, 318 (2005) 
(“Digital rights management is a general term that refers to technology-based protections that aim at 
permitting a rights holder to restrict a user’s access to and control of digital content.”).
127. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 4.2.
128. This has been remarked independently by numerous people, including this author. Bernard Lang, La 
face cachée de la loi sur le droit d’auteur, [The Hidden Side of Copyright Law], 544 le snesup 23 (2006), 
available at http://www.datcha.net/ecrits/liste/face-cachee-droit-auteur-snesup.pdf.
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required by the three-step test, such use is still infringing on what is generally 
intended to be an exclusive right. Hence the policy intent, i.e., the motivation for this 
infringement, should be made clear and the minimalist principle should also be 
followed in this case, limiting the infringement to the steps necessary to achieve the 
policy objectives. Of course, this is discussed from the point of view of international 
instruments, but it makes little sense in the context of a U.S. class action GBS 
Settlement Agreement, which is not intended to implement a policy and does not 
consider such uses as unauthorized to begin with. This difference is precisely the 
heart of the problem.
 Assuming that the primary policy justification is the better use of our cultural 
heritage—the very reason why so many people support the idea of the settlement even 
while criticizing its modalities—will confirm what I have said previously,129 that the 
default situation should be to leave unregistered works freely available to the public, 
with appropriate initial modalities. It is, after all, close to the practical effect of the 
current policy of the U.S. Copyright Office under 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–412, particularly 
regarding U.S. works not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.130 One may 
actually wonder why there should be two registries—except for the fact that the first 
was instituted by Congress according to international agreements and is a prerequisite 
for copyright enforcement for U.S. works, while the second is intended to channel 
royalties to rightsholders under conditions that circumvent international agreements. 
This questionable and inconsistent redundancy is yet another argument in support of 
James Grimmelmann’s remark that the “Google Book Search settlement . . . is a 
judicial solution to a legislative problem.”131 Finally, as in the case of orphan works, 
Google and the Registry should be restrained from any unnecessary further 
infringement, such as exerting further control over the unregistered works made 
available through Display Use, or basing their profit on the nature of the works 
rather than the service provided.
 To summarize, assuming that works can be made legally accessible in digital 
form, no work should be made available for a price covering more than the access 
service, or fettered with some form of DRM, without explicit consent of the 
rightsholder. This is not quite returning the work to the public domain, because its 
availability in digital form can be associated with clauses that return the work to the 
control of its resurfacing rightsholder, or set conditions on for-profit uses, in line 
with what has been proposed or implemented for orphan works so far. It can 
nevertheless be seen as compensation—without cost to the neglectful rightsholders—to 
the public domain for the increases of copyright term.132
 This conclusion is actually reinforced by other considerations, which relate 
directly to the context of the GBS Settlement Agreement, without even considering 
international agreements. If approved, the Settlement Agreement would give an 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 104–05.
130. See supra note 89; see also infra Part V.A.
131. See Grimmelman, supra note 42, at 12.
132. The importance of the issues discussed here is largely a consequence of the duration of copyright term.
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exploitation license to Google for orphan works and unregistered works,133 but would 
not give anyone the rightsholders’ exclusive right to enforce payment for the use of 
these works.134 Hence, for any work that is not claimed in the searchable online 
Books Database135 of the Registry, individual users would have a significant incentive 
to not pay anything, given that the rightsholder is unlikely to reappear and the 
individual prejudice is very small when making or exchanging one copy. In other 
words, it should be expected that digital versions of works known to be orphaned or 
simply unregistered will be widely exchanged for free over the Internet. And it will 
probably be an impossible task to convince anyone that there is anything wrong with 
that, because there is no real legal or moral basis to prevent it and leave the privilege 
of benefiting from unregistered works to the class action parties.136 Furthermore, 
attempts at enforcement might severely undermine the public perception of the 
legitimacy of general copyright enforcement on the Internet, as well as efforts to 
educate the public about the “rightfulness” of such enforcement. That probably would 
be true even if the settlement were to transfer to the parties the rightsholders’ 
exclusive right to enforce payment for the use of unregistered works.137
 The Books Database is useful primarily to Google and the registered 
rightsholders.138 There is no reason its cost should be covered by revenues from the 
133. At this point in the discussion, it is not worth distinguishing orphan and unregistered works, for the 
reasons expounded in the previous section, and simply because the GBS Settlement Agreement does not 
make any difference. See generally Settlement Agreement, supra note 7. 
134. The Settlement Agreement states explicitly in section 3.1(a) that “nothing in this Settlement Agreement 
or a Library-Registry Agreement shall operate to transfer any copyright ownership in Books or Inserts.” 
Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 3.1(a). The agreement is intended only to grant Google permission 
to exploit the works in various ways, sharing the revenue with the Registry, while all rightsholders retain 
their exclusive rights. Indeed, much of the debate about the settlement concerns the possibility for other 
interested parties to get exploitation rights under conditions as favorable as those obtained by Google, 
given that no one has authority to speak for orphan works rightsholders, outside the very disputable 
device of a class action settlement. The settlement describes in considerable detail how users will be 
contractually constrained in their use of the digitized books provided by Google, independently of 
whether they are in-copyright. However, these are only contractual constraints that do not have the 
strength and the wide protection of copyright. It is doubtful that these constraints can be enforced in 
any way against any third party who has somehow obtained a copy of a digitized book, short of a 
copyright action by a rightsholder, which naturally would not be possible in the case of orphan or public 
domain work. Furthermore, as remarked at the end of Part IV.C.1, protection measures are not effective 
on the written word. 
135. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 3.1(b)(ii). Note that despite its name, the Settlement’s Books 
Database contains book metadata, but not the books themselves.
136. See supra notes 44 and 70. The legitimacy of the Registry exploiting those unclaimed works for its own 
benefit is questionable. The public will see no good reason not to share the advantage.
137. See Reding, supra note 122. Viviane Reding notes in her lecture that, in her view, “growing internet 
piracy is a vote of no-confidence in existing business models and legal solutions. It should be a wake-up 
call for policy-makers.” Id.
138. Indeed, there is no indication in the settlement that it might be made available to anyone else.
There is too little specificity in the Agreement about how transparent the BRR will be 
about what books are in or out of copyright, in or out of print, who the rightsholders for 
particular books are, how to contact them, and what books are true “orphans.” This 
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works of the rightsholders who do not benefit from it. The fact that it can help some 
rightsholders make known their rights to some works does not change this, because 
when they are no longer unregistered, they can contribute to the Books Database 
that helped them.
 On the other hand, if the settlement is approved as is, the parties to the class 
action settlement will want to preserve the revenue they can expect from unregistered 
works. The obvious way to do so would be to make it unsafe for would-be users of 
unregistered works to actually attempt to use them by restraining access to the Books 
Database, so that they will not know whether works are registered or not, nor even 
whether they are in the public domain. Consequently, the parties to the class action 
would all have a vested interest in significantly limiting the accessibility of the Books 
Database, thus severely curtailing its usefulness to the cultural and academic 
ecology.139 As maintainers of the Books Database, they would also have a vested 
interest in not trying too hard to determine whether a work is in the public domain 
or is an orphan or unregistered work.140 And one should keep in mind that, according 
to some estimates, unregistered works could well constitute between one-half141 and 
two-thirds142 of the corpus of works being considered in the GBS Settlement.
V. COnCLUsiOn: bridging thE digitaL transitiOn
 A. Does it Make Sense?
 After analyzing the issues raised by the GBS Settlement, identifying some of the 
potential problems, and proposing solutions or guidelines, it is time to identify more 
precisely and more concisely what would be the elements of an adequate answer to 
the question of evolving the copyright system to best take advantage of technological 
evolution. That answer would need to make technical, economic, sociological, and 
information could be important to academic researchers. A scholar, for instance, may 
want to digitize her collection of books on a given subject, which she believes are 
orphan works. It is unclear whether she would be able to get up-to-date information 
from the BRR to determine if a rightsholder has come forward for any of those books or 
to get from Google or the BRR information that they might possess about the “orphan” 
status of particular books.
 Letter from Pamela Samuelson, Professor of Law & Info., Univ. of Cal., to Judge Denny Chin, (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://www.scribd.com/doc/14744864/Samuelson -Letter-to-Judge-Chin-42709.
139. James Grimmelmann, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, J. Internet L. 1, 11, Apr. 2009, 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=james_grimmelmann (“Public 
goods should be widely available. Just by providing the search and download services and by processing 
payments, Google and the Registry will assemble some immensely useful databases about book copyright 
information. These databases are classic public goods, and neither Google nor the Registry will need 
exclusive rights over them as an incentive.”). 
140. Google would even have a vested interest in not indexing, or ranking poorly, copies of orphan works 
made available on the web by any other party. Furthermore, there is no provision for allowing anyone 
else to check that the registry is properly maintained, for example regarding public domain works.
141. See Grimmelmann, supra note 42. 
142. See Brantley supra note 104.
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legal sense; and these suggestions would need to be consistent with the history and 
principles of copyright, so as to not be extremist, revolutionary, or abusive. The first 
guidelines arrived at are as follows:
1.  Eliminate the problem of orphans and the high cost of finding 
rightsholders. The answer to this is, as proposed by the GBS 
Settlement Agreement, to have a registry maintaining a books 
database.
2.  Books that are not registered may be freely accessed and copied 
digitally for reading, scholarly, and not-for-profit purposes.143 
This permission stops when the book is registered, unless the 
rightsholder agrees to its continuation.
 Some people and organizations object to such an open policy on various grounds 
that are briefly described above, but which have little to do with the preservation of 
the interests of rightsholders or the cultural ecology. Whatever one may think of it, 
this policy must have some reasonableness and compatibility with accepted practices 
and recognized rights and interests. As noted above,144 it is very close to the rule 
currently applied to copyright enforcement pursuant to §§ 411 and 412 of the 
Copyright Act. The rule applies to all uses, whether for-profit or not,145 but with 
respect to another registry: the Copyright Office Registry. Only non-U.S. works are 
excused from this constraint because of Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, though 
§ 412 will then limit their protection.
 This remark underscores the baroqueness of the GBS Settlement Agreement and 
its creation of a second registry. It requires authors, already registered with the U.S. 
Copyright Office, for the purpose of fully exercizing their exclusive rights, to register 
again with the settlement-created Book Rights Registry to actually exercise the same 
rights within the settlement and to collect their royalties.146 Why this need for a 
second registration? Apparently because the first one is not up-to-date or complete 
enough, and is therefore useless for identifying and contacting the rightsholders of 
works. Obviously, a single registration in a unique books database, with the obligation 
of maintaining up-to-date information, would be a wiser and simpler solution. The 
Copyright Office’s registry originally had this property, to some extent, when the 
U.S. Copyright Act of 1909 required rightsholders to renew their registration after 
143. It seems difficult to find another policy that would make payment contingent on rightsholder demand, 
and preserve at the same time the privacy of the public. For other uses, policies like those proposed in 
the Orphan Works Acts, without the constraint of the search, could be considered. See supra note 48.
144. See supra note 89 and Part IV.C.2.
145. Actually, the U.S. Copyright Act does not distinguish uses. However, while § 412 does offer protection 
against statutory damage, there is none against other remedies, and it might be unwise to rely on it for 
any use other than transitory. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006). 
146. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7. 
149
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 55 | 2010/11
twenty-eight years in order to maintain their copyright.147 But this obligation 
disappeared with the Copyright Act of 1976.148
 So I add the following third and fourth requirements:
3.  There should be only one books database, where all necessary 
information regarding management of the rights is stored; and
4.  The registration information should be up-to-date, in order to be 
effective.
The implementation of this fourth requirement is open to various methods. For 
example, a simple method would be for the books database system to ask for an 
electronic confirmation from the rightsholders at regular time intervals, and to mark 
the registration as obsolete if the database does not receive a proper response for 
some number of years. This does not cancel the copyright, but only its enforcement 
until the registration is updated. It is a very simple formality, because the maintenance 
confirmation can be on a rightsholder basis, and not for a specific work. It is more 
lenient to rightsholders than the 1909 rule because it only suspends enforcement of 
the copyright, without canceling the copyright outright.149
 Finally, because national formalities150 cannot be imposed, the fifth and last 
requirement is simply this:
5. The books database must be international.
 This does not necessarily require a unique structure. This requirement can be 
implemented as a collection of interconnected and interoperable national databases, 
provided it can be seen as a whole by users, and accessed from any country, whether 
for registration or for other purposes.
 A more sensitive issue is the financing of the books database. It will be fairer, 
more useful, and probably more accurate, if it can be used with open access, whether 
to maintain—with appropriate precautions—or to search its content. It would be 
premature to attempt here a precise answer, but one could certainly imagine that the 
147. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976).
148. See supra note 21.
149. Orphan Works, 70 Fed. Reg. 3740 (Jan. 26, 2005).
Prior to the 1976 Act, the term of protection was limited to 28 years if the copyright 
was not renewed. Under this system, if the copyright owner was no longer interested in 
exploiting the work, or a corporate owner no longer existed, or, in the case of individual 
copyright owners, there were no interested heirs to claim the copyright, then the work 
entered the public domain. Of course, it also meant that some copyrights were 
unintentionally allowed to enter the public domain, for instance, where the claimant 
was unaware that renewal had to occur within the one year window at the end of the 
first term or that the copyright was up for renewal.
 Id. 
150. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2). Actually, Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention precludes all 
formalities, not just national ones. The distinction made here follows the analysis above regarding the 
actual intent of this article as it appeared historically. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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cost of an automated database could be at least partly covered by advertising and 
possibly other services offered to the database patrons. Because the books database is 
a collective resource, it could also be partially financed by the profits from the 
authorization to implement a book search service, which is itself based on collective 
use of the books.
 B. Bridging the Transition
 The U.S. reader of this article may naturally feel that it was absurd to abandon 
the registration system in the late 1970s only to come back to it less than thirty years 
later, out of necessity. This very analysis may seem a confused mess to many readers, 
as it first did to its author. But there is a logic to it.
 The legal systems, whether common law, civil law, or international agreements, 
are themselves only a technology built on the natural laws (in this case, technical and 
socioeconomic laws) of their domain of applicability—written creation and copyright 
in our case. But as I said earlier, the natural socioeconomic laws of copyright have 
changed with the development of the digital world. Hence, reusing the physics 
analogy above,151 my analysis must account simultaneously for two states of the world 
with properties as similar as those of ice and water: the digital world of the Internet 
and the physical world of tangible goods.
 The digital world of the Internet cannot be a legal “no man’s land.” But that does 
not imply that the applicable laws should be identical to the laws used so far in the 
physical world. Indeed, it is not even clear that the laws of the physical world make 
any sense in the digital world, perhaps not any more than the text of a law or a 
contract has the same effect when interpreted in a different legal system. Even though 
copyright now extends far beyond making physical copies, the most prominent 
example is the concept of a copy itself, which is at the heart of copyright and gave 
copyright its name. The reason was that making physical copies was the primary cost 
for making works available, as the stationers or the monks could confirm. Even then, 
copyright was created for the stationers, but not for the monks even though their 
copies were more expensive, and that should give some food for thought. Copyright 
was created when making copies became an industry. It was more an art than an 
industry for the monks, and it ceased to be an industry in the digital world because it 
did not cost anything. What has remained an “industry” is selling copies, more so 
than producing them. Actually, the making of copies is part of the very existence of 
digital entities: because of rapid physical or logical obsolescence;152 because of the 
permanent need to make back-ups; because of all the tools, such as caching, to 
efficiently manage digital entities;153 and because of the needed inter-operability 
151. See supra note 38.
152. This may be the most fundamental role of copying if we are to preserve our digital heritage; physical 
media for digital information degrade quickly, and the often complex techniques of information 
representation on these media evolves constantly, at the risk of being forgotten.
153. Caching is a very general information processing optimization technique, based on the use of temporary 
copies of data in a specific memory, called a cache, usually to share or speed up access.
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between the fast-changing variety of material tools used for digital content. This is 
so true that the lawmakers are now distinguishing copies with “no separate economic 
value of their own” or “no independent economic significance.”154 And the GBS 
Settlement itself has created the concept of a “non-consumptive” use of a work.155 
None of this was needed with the physical world of tangible goods; at worst, even 
with technological change, the very cost of material copies prevented technology 
from changing fast enough to become a problem.
 The constraints of the Berne Convention make good sense as long as we are 
confined to the physical world that we have known until the Internet. The “no 
formality” constraint of article 5(2) is the only way to ensure that individuals will see 
their work protected everywhere (at least within the confines of the Convention 
Union members) without having to endure the excessive legal hassle of satisfying the 
formalities of each country. And, without computers and the Internet, it would be 
unthinkable to have a single, unified formality system available worldwide. Orphan 
works are not too much of a problem because they can be accessed in libraries, and it 
is very seldom the case that anyone would want to exploit them. Exploiting anything 
is expensive, and preference is generally given to the more popular works, which are 
more likely to be cared for by their rightsholders. In sum, there is no long tail.156 And 
given the cost of exploitation, spending some money to find the rightsholders, or to 
conduct a fruitless diligent search, as in Canada or Japan, can remain a sensible 
decision. Similarly, because it is impossible to disseminate the works without making 
copies (at a cost), without protecting the necessary investment with copyright, it can 
be reasonably assumed that copying without explicit permission is always undesirable 
even when no profit is sought.
 But all this changes in the digital world. To begin with, it becomes technologically 
sensible to consider a single world database to register in-copyright works, including 
at least, books and other textual works. Then the arguments developed by some legal 
scholars157 suggesting that formalities are not really a problem make sense, and we 
can reasonably agree with Lawrence Lessig’s suggestion158 to revert back to 
registration, not just for American works, but for all works, de facto eliminating all 
problems related to the country of origin. With a world registration of works, and 
free access to unregistered works, orphan works disappear and works are easily known 
as either freely accessible,159 or under active protection, thus simplifying usage policies 
and making everyone’s life simpler and cheaper.
154. Council Directive 2001/29, recital 33, 2001 O.J. (L167) 10 (EU); Council Directive 2001/29, art. 
5.1(b), 2001 O.J. (L167) 10 (EU). 
155. Settlement Agreement, supra note 7, § 1.90.
156. See Anderson, supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
157. See von Lewinski, supra note 35.
158. See Lessig, supra notes 99 & 115.
159. Unregistered works would be freely accessible, but for-profit uses and derivative works could require a 
proper authority to set a fee to be paid to resurfacing rightsholders, or some other negotiation procedure.
152
orphaN workS aND The GooGLe Book Search SeTTLeMeNT
 Indeed, creation of copies and dissemination of works becomes practically 
costless. Hence it can no longer be implicitly assumed that a fee is required by the 
rightsholder. He may not care, or he may even prefer to maximize his readership by 
giving free and open access to his work. He may even have economic models that 
depend on free access, such as shared production. In addition, there are technical 
copies that are part of the medium rather than part of the copyright economy. The 
very idea of controlling digital copies probably has to be reconsidered in context. The 
point is not to do away with copyright, but to understand how it can be best 
implemented to benefit authors and “to promote progress of science and useful arts” 
in the digital world of today.160
 So, joining the Berne Convention thirty years ago made sense for any democratic 
country that believed in copyright worldwide. But some parts of the Berne Convention, 
and other treaties have to be rethought and reinterpreted,161 if not rewritten, to fit the 
very structure of the digital world while preserving the tradition of a balanced 
copyright regime. This must be an international undertaking. The GBS Settlement 
is raising a host of good questions, but the Settlement Agreement in its current form 
is unlikely to be the right answer. Still, properly amended, it could provide a strong 
incentive, and even leadership, for a global solution that takes into account the new 
reality of the copyright world and contributes to better use, and preservation, of our 
literary heritage.
 C. Does it Matter?
 The analysis presented here rests largely on international considerations and 
aspects of the copyright treaties. But, does it matter for this class action? First, these 
treaties are not self-executing, which means that a U.S. district court is under no 
obligation to take them into account.162 However, if approved, the very nature of this 
class action would be to allow the institution of practices that would actually require 
the enactment of new legislation in many other countries. And new legislation is not 
160. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
161. Changing the letter of the Berne Convention is probably close to impossible. It seems however that it 
leaves enough freedom of interpretation for our purpose. Even though U.S. law is supposed to be 
compliant with the Berne Convention, article § 412 of the Copyright Act assumes a rather weak 
interpretation of the “no formalities” requirement of Berne Convention Article 5.2, since foreign works 
only get limited protection when not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006); 
Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 5(2). This could serve as a precedent for establishing a worldwide 
registry.
162. This is stated very explicitly in § 2(1) of The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988. Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). However, though 
it states in § 2(3) that “the amendments made by this Act, together with the law as it exists on the date 
of the enactment of this Act, satisfy the obligations of the United States in adhering to the Berne 
Convention and no further rights or interests shall be recognized or created for that purpose,” this does 
not mean that U.S. legislation can be later changed without regard for the Convention. The same 
situation holds for the WIPO Treaty on Copyright and the TRIPS agreements. WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, supra note 15; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 16. 
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supposed to ignore international agreements.163 Exerting control over orphan works, 
and all unregistered works, looks like a very good deal for those parties effectively 
participating in the GBS Settlement. If the profit will be as small as they claim,164 
why bother creating “a user ‘tax’” that discourages, rather than encourages, efforts to 
use these works”?165
 It is not a question of underestimating the invaluable contribution to culture and 
scholarship that would result from the availability of these books.166 As a scientist, an 
academic, and a book lover, and for many other reasons, the author will never deny 
this potential. But the fact is that book digitization would come anyway, in some 
form or other, albeit probably more slowly without Google’s leadership, as witnessed 
by other e-library projects around the world. Accelerating this process is good 
business for Google and for the other parties to the settlement, but is it good policy 
for all?
 The main argument of this article is that the world of creation has just been 
through a drastic change: works no longer must be paid for to be disseminated 
because digitization has done away with marginal costs related to printing and 
distributing. There are positive consequences of this, such as open access, free 
software, and the possibility of having the world’s literary heritage available online. 
There are also negative consequences, such as the development of non-commercial 
individual piracy, a phenomenon nearly unknown and certainly not of concern before 
the digital age. Other consequences are less visible. Some actors are trying to take 
advantage of this revolution, and the parties to the settlement are no exception. The 
game is changing and could lead to all kinds of abuses, some more systemic than 
individual piracy, unless a referee steps in and interprets the rules of the game to 
preserve a fair, acceptable, and enforceable balance between the players. This includes 
the authors, the public, publishers, and libraries, and between the different ways, 
especially the new ways, of playing the game. This may mean not preserving 
situations that are no longer warranted, such as the domination of for-profit publishers 
over scientific periodicals.
163. Grimmelman, supra note 42, at 12, 16. James Grimmelmann notes “[t]he Google Book Search 
settlement, then, is a judicial solution to a legislative problem. . . . But . . . legislative problems demand 
legislative solutions,” and suggests that “[w]e should also think about going back to Congress.” Id. But 
that is not an option for achieving a similar result, unless it passes the three-step test, if Congress is to 
follow the current international commitments of the country. Id.
164. See Roy Blount, Let’s Not Lose Our Heads Over a “Monopoly” of Orphans, Authors Guild (June 24, 
2009), http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/roy-blount-on-google-orphans.html. 
165. See Letter from Paul Aiken to Jule Sigall, supra note 46 (stating that “[t]his fee amounts to an unnecessary 
tax on users if no owner comes forward”).
166. Many commentators largely overestimate the benefits of the settlement, by considering it a first order 
improvement, when it actually is only second order. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 42. E-libraries 
are coming anyway, and Google was prepared to create the index even without actually selling access to 
books. The only benefit of the settlement for the public is that this evolution may come a bit earlier, a 
matter of when, not of if; of how fast we get there, not of whether we will. Hence, the cost of the 
settlement to the public is to be balanced against this differential, and not against the global value of 
digitized access to book collections.
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 Actually, the settlement to a class action lawsuit is supposed to be just that: “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.”167 The three-step test is a balancing test intended to 
achieve precisely that purpose and designed and analyzed by copyright specialists for 
the very type of situation that is being discussed. That should be enough to consider 
using it, even if the requirement is not self-executing. The same is true of the “no 
formalities” Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, designed to ensure “fair” treatment 
of authors outside their own country.
 Copyright as we know it is primarily the daughter of the printing press and its 
economic models. Before printing presses, there was no reason for authors to enforce 
anything but moral rights. Indeed, being copied was a form of recognition and 
resulted in a better chance for influence, fame, and survival of one’s work. If, with 
the printing press, copyright became a source of revenue for some authors, it also 
became the best chance for all authors to ensure fame, or at least survival, by financing 
dissemination of their works.168 But this justification for copyright is now virtually 
gone, although others remain. Now, the best chance for readership and intellectual 
survival in the digitized world is open access, coupled with good search facilities. 
Digitization and the Internet are a revolution on the same order as the printing press, 
and there is no chance that this revolution will leave copyright, nor most of the 
activities revolving around it, unchanged.
 In this changing context, the principles of constitutional and international 
agreements, intended to protect the author’s rights without being too specific 
regarding the nature of those rights, are more likely to provide appropriate general 
guidelines. The three-step test has this characteristic,169 as does the Progress Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution, which says nothing about giving the benefits of exclusive 
rights to anyone other than the authors.170 And “the progress of science and useful 
arts” will certainly be better promoted by giving better access to knowledge, when it 
is at no loss to rightsholders.171
 Arbitration by international instruments is also advisable in a context that will 
necessarily be international because of the international role of Google,172 the 
167. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).
168. This explains why copyright started with the stationers: they were doing the dissemination.
169. See Panel Report, supra note 82. The WTO panel did give a strongly economic reading of the three-
step test, but that is to be appreciated in context. The WTO is only concerned with economic issues, as 
witness the fact that it explicitly did not include in the TRIPS agreements article 6bis on moral rights of 
the Berne Convention. But the three-step test appears in several others treaties. See, e.g., WIPO, supra 
note 15. Therefore it would likely have other emphasis, if legally invoked before the corresponding 
international bodies.
170. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
171. Id. § 1.8. (“The Congress shall have Power . . . . To promote Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”).
172. Picker, supra note 42 (“Of course, a project such as the one envisioned by Google—the world’s 
information online—would necessarily intersect with copyright laws across the planet and across 
time.”). 
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international character of the authorship in the concerned libraries, and because it 
will necessarily concern an international public.
 A major issue is preserving the legitimacy of copyright internationally. While 
anyone can understand that an author needs to make a living, or simply may want some 
concrete reward for his contribution to society, any attempt to arbitrarily collect fees by 
people or organizations who have no legitimate rights demeans copyright itself, and the 
will to respect its constraints. The technological context will make it nearly impossible 
to enforce copyright on works, especially written works, when it will be known that it 
does not even benefit the author or any legitimate rightsholder. Nothing can be more 
noxious than a law or a rule that is perceived to be unwarranted, unfair, and 
unenforceable, not to mention the fact that the implementation proposed in the 
settlement will add insult to injury by jeopardizing the privacy of the end users.173
 Finally, it is rather strange to see such a taste for collectivism coming out of the 
United States. The initial lawsuit against Google was based on a collective reading of 
copyright, trying to extract a profit from the making of an index where none of the 
works exist as such (unlike an anthology), and where each contributes only as part of 
the whole. The GBS Settlement aims at a collective management of unregistered 
works, in the interest of the collective rather than that of the individual authors. The 
digital revolution will change copyright, but one would have expected that the 
additional individual freedom would have consequences in some other direction.
173. After Amazon’s “1984” unintended demonstration, it is unlikely that the public will trust future 
corporate statements to the contrary, especially if there is no possibility of control. See generally, Brad 
Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html (discussing Amazon deleting some digital 
editions of two George Orwell books on Kindle devices in 2009). 
